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 In the first chapter of this dissertation, I study the effects of a number of policies 
which affect the electric grid using the SuperOPF, a full AC optimization/simulation 
framework with optimal investment developed at Cornell University.  A 36-node 
model of the Northeast Power Coordinating Council is used to test policies that aim to 
reduce CO2, other emissions, or otherwise impact the operation of the electric grid: a 
base case, with no new environmental legislation; enactment of the Kerry-Lieberman 
CO2 allowance proposal in 2012; following Fukishima, a retirement of all US nuclear 
plants by 2022 with and without Kerry-Lieberman; marginal damages from SO2 and 
NOX emissions charged to coal, gas and oil-fired generation; plug-in hybrid electric 
vehicle load filling; wind incentives in place; and two cases which combine these. The 
cases suggest that alternative policies may have very different outcomes in terms of 
electricity prices, emissions, and health outcomes. In all cases, however, the optimal 
strategy for future investment is investment in new natural gas combined cycle plants. 
Policies can change how much new generation is built, whether other plants are built, 
or what types of plants are retired. 
 The second chapter of my dissertation utilizes the SuperOPF and the model of the 
Northeast Power Coordinating Council to analyze the issue of carbon leakage.  I 
analyze the effects of a regionally-limited carbon cap and trade program, the Regional 
Greenhouse Initiative (RGGI), when additional generating assets in non-affected states 
 are included in the analysis.  In the face of different carbon prices on generating assets 
in covered and non-covered states, generation is expected to shift from states bound by 
RGGI to states outside of RGGI.  This carbon leakage may undermine some or all of 
the benefits of RGGI while simultaneously increasing prices for customers in the area.  
Even though carbon prices under RGGI are very low, some leakage is occurring, and 
this leakage will worsen if carbon prices increase.  Ultimately, a unified policy offers 
greater carbon reduction at a lower cost, which would increase popular acceptance of 
such policies. 
 In the third chapter of this dissertation, my coauthors and I examine the issue of 
demand for carbon reductions.  Recent large-scale field experiments have shown that 
peer information nudges can have significant effects on behavior, inducing people to 
reduce their production of negative externalities. Related work in psychology 
demonstrates that inducing feelings of personal culpability by showing people 
information about their peers can induce pro-social behavior. This study uses a 
contingent valuation experiment and a parallel lab experiment to further explore 
patterns of responses that have been suggested in the emerging literature on norm-
based environmental interventions The field–level finding of asymmetric responses 
between those whose environmental or group impacts are above or below the norm is 
found to be robust across decision settings.However, substantial heterogeneity in 
responses to peer information is observed across a number of demographic and other 
respondent–specific dimensions not able to be explored in large scale field 
experiments, raising questions about the universality of peer-information effects and 
the design of such programs. 
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PREFACE 
1 
CHAPTER 1 
 
MAPPING ENERGY FUTURES: AN INTEGRATED ECONOMIC, 
ENGINEERING AND ENVIROMENTAL APPROACH TO ELECTRIC 
POWER 
 
John Timothy Taber1 
 
ABSTRACT 
 There are a number of national energy models used for investment planning 
and studying the effects of proposed environmental policies on the electric grid.  No 
model to date has included data about actual generators, a network model for the 
electric grid, and emissions.  In this study, the SuperOPF, a full AC 
optimization/simulation framework with optimal investment developed at Cornell 
University is used to study the effects of regulations on the Northeast power system.  
The Northeastern power system is represented by a simplified system of 36 nodes, 
which offers a compromise between computational tractability and accuracy, 
particularly in modeling the limits on important inter-system transmission lines. 
In this paper, I study the effects of a number of policies that aim to reduce CO2, other 
emissions, or otherwise impact the operation of the electric grid: a base case, with no 
new environmental legislation; enactment of the Kerry-Lieberman CO2 allowance 
proposal in 2012; following Fukishima, a retirement of all US nuclear plants by 2022 
with and without Kerry-Lieberman; marginal damages from SO2 and NOX emissions 
                                                
1 Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management, Warren Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 
14853.  Email: jtt24@cornell.edu 
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charged to coal, gas and oil-fired generation; plug-in hybrid electric vehicle load 
filling; wind incentives in place; and two cases which combine these.  The cases 
suggest that alternative policies may have very different outcomes in terms of 
electricity prices, emissions, and health outcomes.  In all cases, however, the optimal 
strategy for future investment is investment in new natural gas combined cycle plants.  
Policies can change how much new generation is built, whether other plants are built, 
or what types of plants are retired. 
 
I. Introduction 
The electric power industry in the United States will face a number of 
challenges in the coming years.  To facilitate energy independence, energy usage may 
swap from the transportation sector to the electricity sector with the addition of plug-in 
hybrid electric vehicles.  Increased electricity loads may also arise as other energy 
users try to find sources of energy that emit less CO2.  Restrictive caps on CO2 
emissions from generation, and the possibility of regulations on the emissions which 
cause fine particulates will affect the electric generating industry and the usage of the 
electric grid.  Finally, an artificial cap on offer prices in electricity markets prevents a 
free market solution for optimal investment, which requires ancillary markets in 
reliability, capacity, and planning. 
Several energy and electricity planning models exist, though none of them 
have both integrated environmental modeling and a model of the electric grid that 
incorporates enough real-world engineering constraints to accurately model power 
flows.  For example, the ICF’s Integrated Planning Model (EPA 2011) is used by the 
3 
EPA to estimate the effects of environmental policies on the electric grid, including 
the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule and the Transport Rule.  However, while the IPM 
does have very detailed information about every generator in the United States 
including information about emissions for various pollutants, its transmission model 
lacks essential details.  The IPM breaks the continental United States down into a few 
dozen regions for analysis.  Within each region, transmission is unconstrained, and 
power flows between regions are constrained by aggregate flow limits.  This model 
ignores the structure of the electric grid entirely, replacing it with a “bubbles and 
pipes” model for ease of analysis.  The Resources for the Future Haiku model (Paul 
and Bertaw 2002) also uses constraints between regions to model flow limits, and uses 
“46 model plants” to estimate generation technology.  The National Energy Modeling 
System (NEMS) supported by the Department of Energy has neither integrated 
modeling of air quality or a model of the electric grid (EIA 2009).  These planning 
tools are useful, but may fail to capture the full impact of new policies because they 
ignore the realities of the electric grid, which constrain the ability to minimize costs 
and dispatch cleaner sources of energy. 
The reduced network model of the electric grid described in this paper includes 
complete information about every generator in the Northeast Power Coordinating 
Council (NPCC) expected in 2006 to be online in 2008, as well as an equivalenced 
model of the underlying electric grid.  It may be used to model policies that may 
change the cost of generation, demand for electricity, and generation mix.  Nine cases 
are analyzed to show the possible uses of this model, which use one or more of the 
following changes to the electric grid: a proposed carbon cap-and-trade law, the 
4 
elimination of nuclear power plants, incentives on renewable electricity, emissions 
taxes based on marginal damages, and the addition of electric vehicles to the electric 
grid. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, I 
describe the optimization problem solved to optimize investment and generator 
dispatch.  A description of the network model for the electric grid and information 
about generators is also provided.  In the third section, I describe the policies modeled 
to produce the nine alternative cases.  In the fourth section, I discuss the results of 
each of these cases and compare them.  In the final section, I provide conclusions. 
 
II. Model Description and Data 
To simulate actual real electricity generation and capacity investment in a 
power market, the following optimization problem is solved: 
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i: generator index 
j: node index 
k: representative hour index 
pijk: aggregate real power output from generator i at node j during 
 representative hour k 
p0ij: existing generator capacity 
Rij: capacity retirement 
Iij: capacity investment 
cFi: cost of fuel, operations and maintenance per MWh 
cTi: cost of taxes and insurance per MW 
cIi: annualized cost of new investment 
Hk: hours system is at load profile k 
ei: emissions vector for generation type I, tonnes/MWh 
ajk: emissions cost vector at node j in hour k, $/tonne 
!mini: min generation for type i 
Kij: max investment in fuel type I at node j 
Bjk: Benefit function for demand response  
Ljk: Net load 
 
The objective function aims to maximize the net benefits of the value of 
generation minus the sum of power and fixed costs, subject to active power flow 
equations and transmission, generation, voltage and other constraints.2  Since we are 
using a DC approximation of the actual AC electric grid, we can ignore costs and 
constraints involving reactive power and voltage angles.  A DC approximation is a 
good model for these purposes (Schulze, 2009), and also ensures the problem is linear, 
which aids in computational tractability. 
                                                
2 This step of the analysis was performed using the SuperOPF and MATPOWER, a collection of 
MATLAB M-files for solving “stochastic, contingency-based, security-constrained optimal power 
flow[s].”  The MATPOWER home page can be found at: http://www.pserc.cornell.edu/matpower.  The 
SuperOPF is still under development.  In terms of the terminology in the SuperOPF, the different 
representative hours are treated as contingencies from the base case (summer peak), and the Positive 
Active Reserve Price is the fixed cost or the investment cost, depending on if the generator is an 
existing unit or a new (potential) unit.  Since we are representing an entire year with each contingency 
instead of the normal time frame of the SuperOPF, ramp rates are unimportant, and each generator has 
ramp rates equal to its maximum power output.  However, to keep coal plants from cycling on and off 
between seasons, their minimum contracted power is set to 15% of PMAX. 
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Each year is split into sixteen representative hour types: four representative 
hour types for each season.  Figure 1.1 shows the percentage of the year modeled by 
each representative hour.  The summer representative hours make up a greater portion 
of the year relative to the other seasons because in this model, summer comprises 
more months than any other season: May through September.  The fall and spring 
hours comprise two months each: October and November, and March and April, with 
the remaining three months falling into the winter category. 
 
FIGURE 1.1: Relative Frequency of Representative Hour Types 
 
Each representative hour is modeled as a deviation from the base hour, summer 
peak.  Generators are de-rated in each season, which reduces their maximum power 
capacity, to simulates unit availability.  Generator availability is highest during the 
peak seasons (summer and winter) because generators are required to carry out 
maintenance during the spring and fall, when demand is lower.  Load can be scaled 
!"#$"#
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(separately for each area in the model) and different emissions costs can be applied.  
Figure 1.2 presents an average of the load scaling across all regions for each 
representative hour.  The summer peak has the highest total system demand.  Most 
regions experience their peak demand at the summer peak due to summer cooling 
needs.  The Maritimes in Canada, however, actually has its annual peak during the 
winter.  Investment in units, especially new units needed to meet this peak demand 
(often called peaking units), is driven by this representative hour.  Although the 
summer peak represents only a small portion of total hours, there must be enough 
capacity on hand to provide for this demand, since storage on a utility scale is 
prohibitively expensive with current technology.  In the real world, there exist peaking 
units that are only used for a few hours for a few days each year, usually on hot 
afternoons in July and August.  These units are typically older oil or natural gas units 
that have very low fixed costs but very high operating costs. 
 
FIGURE 1.2: Average Demand Assumptions for Representative Hour Types 
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Accurate modeling of costs arising from emission policies is central to the 
accuracy of this paper.  Many emissions laws in the United States propose cap-and-
trade programs, which operate by putting a cap on the total amount of emissions, 
distributing emissions allowances, usually by endowment or auction, and establishing 
a permit market with a price for these permits.  A firm that expects to exceed its 
emissions allotment based on the number of allowances it owns may reduce emissions 
or purchase additional permits.  Firms are expected to minimize the costs of these two 
options to maximize their profits.  A cap-and-trade program, like an emissions tax 
(which places a tax on each unit of emissions), puts a price on each unit of emissions.  
Examining the response of the power industry to a price on emissions allows us to 
predict the effect of a cap-and-trade program as well as an emission tax program.  The 
term “emissions price” is used to refer to either the permit price in a cap-and-trade 
program or the emission tax rate.  Firms that are endowed with permits should still 
value their opportunity cost even if they represent windfall earnings. 
Information about fixed and investment costs for generation plants, as well as 
information about operating costs for new plants was obtained from the Energy 
Information Administration (2011).  Four types of new plants were selected to be 
built: dual unit advanced pulverized coal, advanced natural gas combined cycle, dual 
unit nuclear, and onshore wind.  These four plants represent efficient versions of four 
of the most common types of electric power used in the United States for which 
investment is possible.  The overnight cost reported by the EIA was converted into a 
total cost by assuming an equal portion of the overnight cost was spent at the 
9 
beginning of each year, and the debt accrued interest at an annual rate of 8%.  A power 
plant can be expected to pay back its investment in the first 10 years of operation, so a 
capital recovery factor was calculated using equation (4).  Summary information about 
existing generators is provided in Table 1.1.  Although costs are treated as linear in 
this simulation, real-world costs are non-linear.  Most plants have greater thermal 
efficiencies when running at higher outputs, and thus lower marginal cost.  Natural gas 
combined cycle plants in particular have much lower efficiencies and thus much 
higher costs if their second stage steam turbines cannot be used.  However, most of the 
plants in the sample, and many plants in the real world, both peaking and baseload 
units, are either off or at full generation.  The exception is mainly coal plants, which 
are generally hard to start from cold and may cycle from low output to high output 
over the course of a day or a season.  In the aggregate, the linear cost assumption 
should not affect the results of the simulation greatly, and it also an assumption shared 
by many planning models developed for the power industry. 
 
TABLE 1.1: Information about Existing Generators 
Fuel Type Fixed Cost 
$/MW 
Total Variable Cost $/MWh 
Mean Min Max 
Coal $29,670 $37.26 $22.14 $293.16 
Natural Gas $14,620 $72.32 $39.47 $240.11 
Wind $28,070 $0 $0 $0 
Nuclear $88,750 $2.04 $2.04 $2.04 
Oil $14,620 $283.84 $31.47 $1,040 
Hydro $13,440 $0 $0 $0 
MSW 
(Municipal 
Solid Waste) 
$373,760 $0 $0 $0 
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CRF: Capital Recovery Factor 
i: Interest Rate (8%) 
n: Compounding Periods (10 Years) 
 
For ten years and an annual interest rate of 8%, a plant is built if it can cover 
14.9% of the total construction cost in the first year of operation.  Generation costs 
assume prevailing rates for fuels are the same as the average in the region for 2010: 
$5.56/thousand cubic feet for NG and $2.82/MBTU for coal.  In line with DOE 
estimates, natural gas prices increase by about 20% in 2022, and a further 23% in 
2032.  Coal prices decrease slightly (98% of 2012 costs) in 2022, and increase 4% 
from that value by 2032.  Total capacity additions are limited to 15% of the maximum 
rate in a 5-year period in which each type of fuel has, historically, been built in the 
entire United States.  This corresponds to the NPCC’s share of total US electrical 
generation.  For example, between 1985 and 1990, approximately 34 GW of nuclear 
capacity was built in the United States.  Thus, 5 GW is a conservative upper limit for 
the nuclear capacity that could be built by 2022 in the NPCC.  Information about new 
generators is summarized in Table 1.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (4) 
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TABLE 1.2: Information about New Generators 
Fuel Type Capital 
Recovery/Year 
$/MW 
Total Variable Cost 
$/MWh 
Total Possible 
Capacity Additions 
Coal $497,201 $29.05 10 GW 
Natural Gas $181,824 $39.05 32 GW 
Wind* $392,322 $0 3.5 GW 
Nuclear $1,141,454 $2.04 5 GW 
*Wind assumes an average capacity factor of 33%, excluding federal and state 
incentives. 
 
The distribution of demand and the tradeoff between fixed and variable cost 
drives the investment and maintenance of different kinds of units.  For example, 
roughly 30% of the year has an expected load at about half of peak load: The low 
demand case for each season in Figures 1.1 and 1.2.  (And the entire year has a 
demand at half of peak load or more.)  For a power plant running 8,760 hours a year, 
total costs for an average fossil-fuel plant range from a low of $356,000/MW for a 
coal plant to over $2.5 million dollars/MW for an oil plant.   However, if a plant is 
only running for the summer peak, 184 hours a year, the average natural gas plant 
costs under $28,000/MW to operate, cheaper than any other plant type except for 
hydropower. 
This analysis uses a network reduction of the Northeastern United States 
developed by Allen, Lang and Ilic (2008.)  A diagram of this network is shown in 
Figure 1.3.  Each point on this diagram represents a bus in the network, which are both 
numbered and named by the independent system operator or planning authority.  The 
spatial layout of the busses roughly corresponds to their geographic location.  The two 
lone busses at the top of the figure are Hydro Quebec and New Brunswick.  The five 
busses at the left side correspond to Ontario, which connect into the western New 
12 
York System.  The entire middle of the diagram and the bottom right correspond to 
busses in New York, which connect to Pennsylvania and New Jersey (at the bottom 
left) and New England (at the middle right.)  The lines connecting these busses 
correspond to the actual or equivalenced lines in the real world.  In this work, Allen et 
al. reduced the Northeast Power Coordinating Council area to a 36 bus3 model, while 
maintaining important line flow constraints.   Having an accurate model of the 
network over which electricity flows is vital.  Consider the highly simplified power 
network depicted in Figure 1.4.  In this network, power can flow from the generator on 
the left to the load on the right via two pathways.  If each segment has equal resistance 
and length, Kirchoff’s Law will predict that 1/3 of the electric flow will along the 
upper path, and 2/3 will flow along the bottom path.  In an actual electric grid, power 
flows from generator to load along all possible pathways simultaneously, which means 
changes in generation or load at one node can cause transmission congestion at nodes 
far removed.  Conversely, transmission limits at lines far removed from the shortest 
path between a generator and a load may reduce the total power able to flow from a 
source to a load.  Lines which carry more power than their rated capacity for too long 
actually warm up and sag, which may cause them to dip into trees and ground out.  
One of the causes of the Northeast Blackout of 2003 were power lines in Ohio sagging 
into trees, which triggered a chain reaction and ultimately destabilized the electric 
grid. 
                                                
3 A bus is one node on the network, usually containing both load (customers) and generating units and 
connected to other busses via transmission lines. 
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FIGURE 1.3.  Diagram of 36-bus model from Allen et al. (2008). 
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 FIGURE 1.4.  Schematic of Electricity Network 
Data on existing generating units, provided by Energy Visuals, came from the 
2006 reliability planning process of the Multiregional Modeling Working Group, and 
includes data on units projected to be operational in the summer of 2008.  Data on fuel 
type, heat rate, generation cost, and emissions of CO2, SO2 and NOX are included for 
each plant.  For more details on this stage of the analysis, refer to Schulze et al (2009.) 
The benefits function for demand response is based off the long-run elasticity 
and growth rates for elasticity.  As electricity prices increase, whether due to natural 
growth of the system, or to added costs to generation from emissions prices, people 
will respond by cutting back their level of power consumption.  In the long run, the 
elasticity of demand for electricity is approximately -1 (Dahl, 1993).  However, recent 
research suggests that, even in the short run, the elasticity of people responding to 
average prices (ie, utility bills) is -0.982 (Fell et all, 2011).  Since each step of our 
model represents 10 years, an elasticity of -1 is used to represent demand response.  
Average distribution costs are assumed to be $70/MWh.  In the NPCC, the average 
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LMP (locational marginal price4) for the base year is also $70/MWh.  Thus, 
$140/MWh is a good estimate for retail prices with no new policies.  A 2.5% reduction 
in demand would be expected as prices increased to $143.50, or an increase in LMP 
from $70 to $73.50.  Because this optimization problem must remain a linear program, 
demand response is represented in ten blocks, each representing 2.5% of total load.  
The effective price for each block of demand response is at the midpoint of each 
interval.  Load is also expected to naturally grow as a result of increasing population 
and demand for energy.  The New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) 
estimates this load growth at 0.59% per year (NYISO 2009.) 
 
III. Description of the Nine Cases 
Each of these cases was simulated for an initial year without investment: 2022.  
Each cycle of investment is assumed to take ten years.  Ten years is enough time for 
any kind of power plant, including a nuclear plant to be built, assuming regulatory and 
siting issues could be resolved.  The first cycle of investment thus ends in 2022, and 
the second investment cycle ends in 2032.  For comparison, the first case modeled 
includes no environmental regulations or subsidies for power generation or capacity.  
This case is referred to either as the base case or the no regulation case. 
The second case modeled is the American Power Act, often referred to as the 
Kerry-Lieberman CO2 Cap and Trade Bill.  The Kerry-Lieberman Bill proposed cap 
and trade auctions for CO2 beginning in 2012, with a cap starting at the 2005 level, 
and a targeted reduction of 17% by 2020 and 42% by 2030.  However, the bill also 
                                                
4 Because of transmission constraints, prices may differ from node to node.  Most independent system 
operators have locational marginal prices, so the nodal prices are refereed to as LMPs. 
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included a price collar for CO2 prices.  The price floor would start at $12/ton, and 
increase by 3% annually in real terms, while the price ceiling would start at $25 and 
increase by 5% annually in real terms.  Previous work (Schulze et al 2009) has shown 
that, with no new investment allowed, the targeted CO2 reductions are unmet, and the 
CO2 prices reach the ceiling by 2016.  The addition of new investment might change 
this however. 
In the third case, power plants are charged marginal damages equal to the 
health impacts of their SO2 and NOX emissions.  The same air transport model from 
The Hidden Cost of Energy (2010) was used to calculate ambient SO2, NOX and fine 
particulate matter concentrations in every county in the NPCC as a result of emissions 
from every generator in the model.  Finally, information about risks of morbidity and 
mortality from these emissions were used to calculate marginal damages for each 
plant. Table 1.3 shows summary information about these marginal damages and 
emissions.  AES Cayuga5, also known as Milliken Station, is a coal-fired power plant 
located on Cayuga Lake near Cornell University.  It is an exceptionally efficient coal 
plant, mostly due to the fact that Cayuga Lake is a deep lake with an abundant supply 
of cold water, which makes for a very efficient thermal cycle.  The maximum 
marginal damage coal plants are Portland Units H&L in Northhampton, PA, located 
less than 100 miles west of New York City.  The average coal plant is 45 times more 
damaging than the average natural gas plant, and the most damaging coal plants cause 
                                                
5 AES Cayuga is chosen at a basis for comparison for several reasons.  First, it is a very efficient coal 
unit with low emissions, so illustrates the lower end of emissions and damages.  Second, it is near 
Ithaca, NY, so many power engineers and energy economists visiting the area have knowledge of the 
plant.  Lastly, information about the plant is easy to verify, since many people at Cornell have 
experience with AES Cayuga. 
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twice as much damage as that.  On the other hand, some coal plants, like AES Cayuga, 
are not very damaging. Nor are coal plants that lack significant population centers 
downwind, such as a coal plants on the Atlantic coast.  Of course, the newest natural 
gas combined cycle plants are even more efficient than the average natural gas plants 
plant in this sample, and have correspondingly lower marginal damages in per MWh 
terms. 
TABLE 1.3: Emissions and Marginal Damages for example generating units 
Unit Name or 
Type 
CO2 Rate 
Tonnes/MWh 
SO2 Rate 
Tonnes/MWh 
NOX Rate 
Tonnes/MWh 
Marginal 
Damages 
$/MWh 
AES Cayuga 1 0.98 <0.001 <0.001 7.22 
Average Coal 1.05 0.007 0.001 89.87 
Max MD Coal 1.00 0.013 0.001 232.20 
Average NG 0.65 <.0001 <0.001 2.36 
 
In the fourth case, electrifying the transportation sector was investigated.  
Using a report from Berkeley (Becker et al 2009), an estimate for the total number of 
electric vehicles in 2022 and 2032 was used to increase the low demand hours on the 
grid, assuming that vehicles were charging at night.  In 2022, 703 MW would be 
added to the low demand hours at each node, as a result of almost 600,000 plug-in 
hybrid vehicles with a 2kWh battery, and over 200,000 electric vehicles with 16 kWh 
batteries.  By 2032, the Northeast might have 5,412 MW of additional demand (over 
2012) from over 725,000 plug-in hybrid vehicles and around two million electric 
vehicles.  This assumes that adoption rates for plug-in hybrids and electric vehicles are 
equally spread across the country, though some estimates suggest that western states 
would experience faster adoption rates than the northeast. 
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In the fifth case, incentives for wind generation are added.  Policies modeled 
include the United States production credit for wind generation, and similar credits in 
Ontario, Quebec and the Maritimes.  Some states offer subsidies to reduce 
construction costs, such as Massachusetts and Delaware.  Because many states are 
aggregated into some buses in this model, an average value for every state in a region 
was used to model these policies.  (For example, Bus 1 includes generation from 
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Massachusetts, Maryland and New Jersey.)  Wind incentives 
currently in force are expected to continue through 2032. 
After the earthquakes, tsunamis and Fukushima disaster in Japan, there was 
talk in New York about shutting down nuclear power plants, particularly those close to 
large populated areas, such as Indian Point Energy Center.  Expanding on this idea, the 
sixth policy modeled decommissions all nuclear power plants in the NPCC by 2022, 
with no other regulations.  The system lacks enough spare generating capacity to 
decommission the plants without building new generators.  In a separate case, 
decommissioning nuclear power plants was combined with the proposed Kerry-
Lieberman cap and trade bill as well. 
Two additional cases were also modeled which combine several aspects of the 
previous cases in order to predict the most likely path of the power system to 2032 
given current policies and expected developments, the best guess case, and the socially 
optimal path of the power system through 2032.  For the best guess case, wind 
incentives are expected to stay in place through 2032, PHEV load-filling is expected 
to occur, and some form of CO2 emissions control is expected to be in place starting in 
2022, modeled by having CO2 prices at the Kerry-Lieberman CO2 price cap and 
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applied to all units greater than 25 megawatts.  Estimated prices for the EPA’s new 
Cross-State Air Pollution Rule are included, although a full modeling of the rules will 
not be accurate until the entire Eastern Interconnect and all of the covered states is 
included (EPA, 2011.)  For the purposes of this simulation, generators in New York, 
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland, Delaware and Washington, DC are counted as 
Group 1 states.  Although in the current proposed rule, Delaware and DC are 
exempted, there are only a few generators included, so it should not significantly 
impact the model.  Group 1 states are charged $1,000/ton of SO2 emissions in 2012, 
and $1,100/ton in 2022 and 2032.  Annual NOX emissions permits are expected to cost 
$500 in 2012 and $600 in 2022 and 2032, with permits during the summer ozone 
season (which corresponds to the summer representative hours in the model) priced at 
$1,300/ton in 2012 and $1,500/ton in 2022 and 2032.  These emissions price are only 
charged on units greater than 25MW, as with most EPA emissions prices.  As with 
generation costs, I assume that emissions are linear with plant output.  Although this 
assumption is not strictly true (plants become more efficient as they increase their 
output) this assumption is close enough for the purposes of this analysis. 
In the socially optimal case, marginal damages on SO2 and NOX emissions, 
PHEV load-filling and a $30/tonne price on CO2 are applied starting in 2022.  
$30/tonne is the value for the social cost of carbon used in the Hidden Cost of Energy.  
Note that as in the Marginal Damages case, these costs are applied to all units, 
regardless of size (unlike the Kerry-Lieberman CO2 prices, which are only applied to 
units larger than 25MW.)   
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IV. Results of the Nine Cases 
Every case modeled has four figures.  The first two figures show the actual 
levels of capacity and investment in the case, and the third and fourth figures show the 
changes in capacity (the left figure in each pair) and generation (the right figure) that 
occur from 2012-2022 and from 2022-2032.  The maximum vertical scales on the first 
and second figures are the same for each case, to assist in comparing outcomes: 100 
GW for the capacity figure, and 400 TWh for the generation figure. 
The results for the no regulations case, also called the base case, are depicted 
in figures 1.5-1.8.  For reasons having to do solely with the relative costs of the units, 
the optimal investment path for the system is to build new natural gas units and retire 
oil units.  Oil units, especially in the Northeast, are mostly older units used as 
“peakers” to meet demand during peak load hours.  They have some of the highest 
marginal costs, and it is not surprising that these units would be retired first.  
Approximately 12 GW of natural gas capacity is built by 2022, and a further 3 GW by 
2032.  The decline in natural gas generation between 2022 and 2032 is a result of older 
natural gas units being used less: their generation is 125 TWh is 2012, 69 TWh in 
2022, and 46 TWh in 2032, while the generation of new natural gas units increases 
from 0 in 2012 to 92 TWh in 2032.  Natural gas generation is essentially made up of 
two kinds of units: older natural gas generators, which are cheap to build but 
expensive to operation, and newer combined cycle turbines, which are a little more 
expensive to build (though still cheaper than any other generator) but cheap to operate. 
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FIGURE 1.5: Capacity in the Base Case 
 
 
FIGURE 1.6: Generation in the Base Case 
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FIGURES 1.7 and 1.8: Capacity and Generation Changes in the Base Case 
 
Figures 1.9-1.12 show the results of the Kerry-Lieberman CO2 case.  Imposing 
CO2 prices reduces the capacity and generation of coal and oil units while increasing 
the capacity of generation of natural gas  units, though these increases are less than 
they were in the base case.  12 GW of natural gas generation is added by 2022, though 
as in the base case, some old natural gas capacity is simultaneously retired.  In 2032, 
these retirements outweigh the (modest) capacity additions.  The Kerry-Lieberman 
CO2 case has less total capacity and generation because higher prices than the base 
case lead to more demand response and less total load.  Load in 2032 is at 89% of 
2012 levels, despite a 12% growth in the pre-demand response base level of load. 
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FIGURE 1.9: Capacity in the Kerry-Lieberman CO2 Case 
 
 
FIGURE 1.10: Generation in the Kerry-Lieberman CO2 Case 
 
L>*+# L>*+# L>*+#
EF# EF# EF#E5G+0*1# E5G+0*1# E5G+0*1#
H-+# H-+# H-+#I0.0?*J+0K# I0.0?*J+0K# I0.0?*J+0K#!#(!#
$!#@!#
%!#A!#
&!#B!#
'!#C!#
(!!#
$!($# $!$$# $!@$#
!
"
#
L>*+# L>*+# L>*+#EF# EF# EF#
E5G+0*1# E5G+0*1# E5G+0*1#
H-+# H-+# H-+#
I0.0?*J+0K# I0.0?*J+0K# I0.0?*J+0K#
!#A!#
(!!#(A!#
$!!#$A!#
@!!#@A!#
%!!#
$!($# $!$$# $!@$#
$
"
%
#
24 
 
FIGURES 1.11 and 1.12: Capacity and Generation Changes in the Kerry-Lieberman 
CO2 Case 
 
Figures 1.13-1.16 depict the results of the marginal damages case.  Note that 
marginal damages are not applied until 2022, so the 2012 results are the same as for 
the base case.  This case is very effective at forcing coal plants to retire.  Almost 80% 
of coal capacity is retired by 2022, and the system builds natural gas plants and retires 
less oil plants to make up the difference.  Combined with the availability of more 
efficient natural gas combined cycle plants, natural gas capacity increases by over 
50% by 2022, and natural gas generation more than doubles.  Price increases keep 
load growth to minimal levels, which explain the modest investment in new natural 
gas plants between 2022 and 2032.  
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FIGURE 1.13: Capacity in the Marginal Damages Case 
 
 FIGURE 1.14: Generation in the Marginal Damages Case 
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FIGURES 1.15 and 1.16: Capacity and Generation Changes in the Marginal Damages 
Case  
 
Figures 1.17-1.20 shows the results of the Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicles 
(PHEV) case.  The results from the PHEV case are almost identical to the base case, 
except that slightly more natural gas capacity is built, and slightly more oil capacity is 
decommissioned.  There are similar changes in generation as well.  Raising the low 
demand hour increases the need for base load generation, which is met by new natural 
gas combined cycle units, and reduces the need for oil peaking.  Generation from 
natural gas units increases from 2022-2032, the most obvious departure from the base 
case. 
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FIGURE 1.17: Capacity in the PHEV Case 
 
FIGURE 1.18: Generation in the PHEV Case 
 
FIGURE 1.19 and 1.20: Capacity and Generation Changes in the PHEV Case  
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Figures 1.21-1.24 show the results for the wind incentives case.  For the first 
time, something other than natural gas capacity is built: wind turbines.  These wind 
generators are built at the expense of natural gas capacity, though almost 15 GW of 
new natural gas capacity is built by 2032, just a just a little less than the base case.  
The subsidies on wind generation actually lower the average wholesale price of 
electricity and lead to smaller decreases in load, so total generation is somewhat 
higher than in the base case.  The decrease in natural gas capacity between 2022 and 
2032 is, like the Kerry-Lieberman case, driven by the retirement of old natural gas 
generators, not newer combined-cycle turbine units. 
 
 
FIGURE 1.21: Capacity in the Wind Incentives Case 
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FIGURE 1.22: Generation in the Wind Incentives Case 
 
 
FIGURES 1.23 and 1.24: Capacity and Generation Changes in the Wind Incentives 
Case 
 
Figures 1.25-1.32 show the results of the two no nuclear cases.  In 2012, the no 
nuclear, no regulations case is identical to the base case.  Without any environmental 
regulations, a much larger quantity of new generation is needed, so the system builds 
more natural gas capacity and decommissions less oil capacity.  Although the same 
quantity of coal capacity is used as in the base case, slightly more coal and oil 
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generation occurs, and much more natural gas generation.  When nuclear plants are 
decommissioned and the proposed Kerry-Lieberman law is applied, the system 
behaves in a similar manner, though the magnitude of changes from the base case is 
less.  There is more natural gas capacity and oil capacity than the base case and the 
original Kerry-Lieberman case, but less than the no nuclear case with no regulations.  
Likewise, there is less natural gas generation than in the no nuclear, no regulations 
case, but more than in the base case and the original Kerry-Lieberman case.  Coal 
capacity and generation also declines, almost as much as in the original Kerry-
Lieberman case in 2032, though not quite as much in 2022. 
 
FIGURE 1.25: Capacity in the No Nuclear, No Regulation Case 
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FIGURE 1.26: Generation in the No Nuclear, No Regulation Case 
 
 
FIGURES 1.27 and 1.28: Capacity and Generation Changes in the No Nuclear, No 
Regulation Case 
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FIGURE 1.29: Capacity in the No Nuclear, Kerry-Lieberman CO2 Case 
 
 
FIGURE 1.30: Generation in the No Nuclear, Kerry-Lieberman CO2 Case 
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FIGURES 1.31 and 1.32: Changes in Capacity and Generation in the No Nuclear, 
Kerry-Lieberman Case 
 
Next, Figures 1.33-1.37 compare all these cases to each other.  In these figures, 
the order of the labels is the same as the magnitude of each line in 2032.  In Figure 
1.33, total demand is plotted for each case, and for the no demand response case to 
illustrate the level of load abatement due to increasing prices in each case.  Note that 
the origin is not at zero, but rather 500,000 TWh.  Starting from the base case, wind 
incentives and no regulations are almost identical, though the wind case has a little 
more demand and generation, because prices are somewhat lower due to wind 
subsidies in some low-demand hours.  The PHEV case has more demand than the base 
case due to the fact that load filling at off-peak hours does not much affect prices but 
does add to total demand.  The no nuclear and no new regulations case has higher 
prices than the base case, which drives demand down somewhat, though as new 
generation is brought online, the differences in prices are reduced and demand 
recovers.  Demand is nearly static for the marginal damages case because demand 
L>*+# L>*+#
EF#
EF#
E5G+0*1#
H-+# H-+#
M%!#M@!#
M$!#M(!#
!#(!#
$!#@!#
%!#
$!$$# $!@$#!"# L>*+# L>*+#
EF#
EF#
E5G+0*1#
H-+# H-+#
M$A!#M$!!#
M(A!#M(!!#
MA!#!#
A!#(!!#
(A!#$!!#
$A!#
$!$$# $!@$#$"%#
34 
response due to price increases nearly balance out the natural load increases.  Finally, 
the Kerry-Lieberman cases have the lowest load, because they experience the highest 
prices and thus the most demand response. 
 
 
FIGURE 1.33: Total Demand 
 
Figure 1.34 shows total capacity, which is broadly similar to total demand.  
Again, the origin of this Figure is at 100 GW to help differentiate the capacity paths of 
the various cases.  The no demand response line shows how much new capacity is 
avoided due to demand response, in this case anywhere from 5 GW in the wind 
incentives case to 19 GW in the no nuclear Kerry-Lieberman case.  Wind incentives 
have the next highest capacity, because so much wind capacity is built due to the 
incentives, which results in lower prices, higher demand, and thus higher capacity.  
The PHEV and the base cases have nearly identical capacity, because very little new 
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capacity is needed to provide more generation at low-demand hours.  The remaining 
cases all require less capacity because increased prices have reduced load, and thus 
capacity.  This is especially true at summer peak hours.  If the very expensive 
marginal oil units are brought online, summer peak prices may increase from 
$300/MWh to $1,000 MWh, resulting in a great deal of demand response, and thus 
less new capacity additions, since the summer peak drives capacity additions.  The no 
nuclear cases both experience sharp declines in 2022 as nuclear plants are 
decommissioned, though both recover as new capacity is brought online, demand 
response lessens, and the need for new capacity increases. 
 
FIGURE 1.34: Total Capacity 
 
Figure 1.35 shows average wholesale prices (weighted by load across busses 
and hours across representative hours.)  Note again that this figure does not have an 
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origin at zero to highlight the differences between the cases.  The PHEV, no 
regulations and wind incentives all have low prices, with wind incentives having the 
lowest prices due to wind subsidies lowering the cost at some hours.  Removing 
nuclear plants without imposing new regulations leads to slightly higher prices than 
imposing marginal damages in 2022, but the addition of new capacity reverses that 
trend in 2032.  This is similar to the total demand results because total demand is 
essentially a function of average wholesale prices.  Finally, the Kerry-Lieberman cases 
increase average wholesale prices the most, with the no nuclear case increasing prices 
more than the case with nuclear generators, because more fossil fuel units are needed, 
driving up the price of the marginal unit to more expensive coal and oil units, 
depending on the load profile. 
 
 
FIGURE 1.35: Average Wholesale Prices 
 
Figure 1.36 shows CO2 emissions for each case.  Even with no regulations, 
CO2 emissions decrease slightly as coal generation is replaced with more efficient and 
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cheaper natural gas generation.  Although the PHEV case has more total generation, 
taking into account the effect of displaced gasoline-powered cars, the total CO2 
emissions decline relative to the base case.  Likewise, the wind incentives case has 
emissions slightly below the base case, as increased wind generation displaces some 
fossil fuel generation, even though there is more total generation because of slightly 
lowered prices.  Removing nuclear plants produces a dramatic increase in CO2 
emissions, although with Kerry-Lieberman rules in place, these emissions drop below 
the base case by 2032.  With the Kerry-Lieberman rule, CO2 emissions are at the 
Kerry-Lieberman emissions cap in 2022, with prices just below the price cap, but by 
2032, CO2 emissions exceed the CO2 cap and CO2 prices at the cap.  Finally, and most 
surprisingly, the case most effective at reducing CO2 emissions is the marginal 
damages case, which does not directly affect CO2 emissions at all.  However, it does 
make operating coal plants much more expensive than natural gas plants, which drives 
fuel-shifting and new investment to a much greater degree than Kerry-Lieberman 
does. 
 
FIGURE 1.36: CO2 Emissions 
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Figure 1.37 shows the expected number of lives saved relative to the base case 
for each case.  The plug-in hybrid case is excluded because of insufficient information 
about the number of deaths avoided due to retiring conventional automobiles; 
displaying the results from just the generation would (incorrectly) show that the PHEV 
case caused more fatalities than in the base case.  Mortality from power plant 
emissions is mostly caused as SO2 and NOX emissions create fine particulate pollution 
at receptor sites.  At the low end of the chart, removing nuclear plants without 
imposing new regulations is expected to kill approximately 100 people a year.  Taking 
just one plant offline, for example, Indian Point, would be expected to kill about 9 
people a year.  The proposed Kerry-Lieberman CO2 bill, with and without nuclear 
plants, does a better job of saving lives as generation shifts from the more harmful 
coal plants to the less harmful natural gas plants.  Finally, charging marginal damages 
saves over 2,000 lives every year, as coal generation is driven to less than 20% of base 
levels by 2032. 
 
 
FIGURE 1.37: Expected Number of Lives Saved Compared to the Base Case 
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Figures 1.38-1.41 show the results of the best guess case.  Aspects of both the 
wind incentives and the Kerry-Lieberman cases can be seen in the best guess case.  
There is more investment in and generation from wind generating units than in the 
wind incentives case, probably because of the additional incentives for less-polluting 
generation created by the Kerry-Lieberman price caps on CO2 in 2022 and 2032 and 
the EPA’s Cross-State Air Pollution Rule.  As well, there is increased demand at low-
load hours because of the PHEV load filling in those years.  There are slightly lower 
levels of oil and coal capacity and generation than compared to the Kerry-Lieberman 
case, and slightly higher levels of natural gas.  These changes are likely due to the new 
EPA rule, which place high prices on the SO2 and NOX emissions that characterize 
coal plants.  The EPA price forecasts for the Cross-State Air Rule used here are 
probably not accurately modeled – in the EPA’s modeling, there are only small 
changes in power generation, while in this simulation, coal generation falls by over 
40%.  The reductions in SO2 and NOX are smaller in the Northeast than the new rules 
require, although the NPCC has less coal-fired generation, and a greater proportion of 
emissions reductions would be expected to come from the Midwest and southeast. 
40 
  
FIGURE 1.38: Capacity in the Best Guess Case 
 
 
FIGURE 1.39: Generation in the Best Guess Case 
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FIGURES 1.40 and 1.41: Capacity and Generation Changes in the Best Guess Case 
 
Figures 1.42-1.45 show the results from the socially optimal case.  As in the 
marginal damages case, natural gas capacity increases rapidly and coal is almost 
completely eliminated from the system.  The addition of the social cost of carbon 
reduces total generation, despite the addition of PHEV, relative to the marginal 
damages case by about 6%.  No wind capacity is built in this case, either, so wind 
generation is only built in the presence of incentives for wind, even in the presence of 
prices for all three pollutants.  Coal capacity is also slightly lower than in the marginal 
damages case, likely a result of the addition of a carbon price. 
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FIGURE 1.42: Capacity in the Socially Optimal Case 
 
 
FIGURE 1.43: Generation in the Socially Optimal Case 
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FIGURES 1.44 and 1.45: Capacity and Generation Changes in the Socially Optimal 
Case 
 
Finally, Figures 1.46-1.48 compares the results of the best guess, socially 
optimal and base cases in terms of average wholesale prices, CO2 emissions, and 
expected number of deaths per year.  Both cases have higher average wholesale 
electricity prices than the base case, though neither dominates the other for the entire 
time period, and the difference are not large.  The prices from these two cases rival the 
Kerry-Lieberman case, and are only exceeded by the no nuclear Kerry Lieberman 
case.  The socially optimal case has by far the lowest CO2 emissions, beating the 
marginal damages case, 20% lower in 2022 and almost 40% lower in 2032.  The best 
guess case is lower than the Kerry-Lieberman case, and it is even below the Kerry-
Lieberman CO2 cap and the marginal damages emissions in 2032.  When it comes to 
the last comparison, the socially optimal case results in the most lives saved of any 
case, including the original marginal damages case.  These estimate for lives saved are 
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also a lower bound, because lives saved from reduced automotive emissions are not 
yet accounted for in this model. 
 
FIGURE 1.46: Average LMP in the Best Guess, Socially Optimal and Base Cases 
 
 
FIGURE 1.47: CO2 Emissions in the Best Guess, Socially Optimal and Base Cases 
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FIGURE 1.48: Lives Saved Per Year Relative to the Base Case 
 
 
V. Conclusions 
Using a transmission-constrained model with actual generator data is essential 
for estimating impacts to the electric grid from large-scale policies.  Transmission and 
generation constraints are a factor for all of the analyses in this paper, and provide a 
more realistic picture of the effects of policies than the “bubbles and pipes” models 
commonly used which neglect intra-region transmission constraints and greatly 
simplify inter-region transmission. 
Looking at the policies in this paper, three facts stand out.  First, demand 
response is incredibly important for accurately modeling the electric grid.  Demand 
response can have a very large impact on CO2 emissions and load, while having a 
relatively smaller impact on prices.  Second, natural gas combined cycle seems to be 
the future of power plant construction, if forecasts for natural gas prices and 
construction costs for plants are accurate.  Unless wind is subsidized, natural gas 
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combined cycle plants are superior to every other type of generation in terms of annual 
costs with or without new emissions regulations, whether CO2 or marginal damages.  
Finally, charging marginal damages for SO2 and NOX is the most effective policy for 
saving lives, reducing CO2, and results in lower prices than strict carbon-reducing 
policies such as the proposed Kerry-Lieberman bill.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
CARBON LEAKAGE AND THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS 
INITIATIVE: AN ANALYSIS WITH A TRANSMISSION-CONSTRAINED 
REDUCED NETWORK ELECTRICITY MODEL 
 
 
John Timothy Taber6 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
There are a number of national energy models used for investment planning 
and studying the effects of proposed environmental policies on the electric grid.  No 
model to date has included data about actual generators, a network model for the 
electric grid, and emissions.  In this study, the SuperOPF, a full AC 
optimization/simulation framework with optimal investment developed at Cornell 
University is used to study the effects of regulations on the Northeast power system.  
The Northeastern power system is represented by a simplified system of 36 nodes, 
which offers a compromise between computational tractability and accuracy, 
particularly in modeling the limits on important inter-system transmission lines. 
In this paper, I analyze the effects of a regionally-limited carbon cap and trade 
program, the Regional Greenhouse Initiative (RGGI), when additional generating 
assets in non-affected states are included in the analysis.  In the face of different 
carbon prices on generating assets in covered and non-covered states, generation is 
                                                
6 Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management, Warren Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 
14853.  Email: jtt24@cornell.edu 
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expected to shift from states bound by RGGI to states outside of RGGI.  This carbon 
leakage may undermine some or all of the benefits of RGGI while simultaneously 
increasing prices for customers in the area.  Even though carbon prices under RGGI 
are very low, some leakage is occurring, and this leakage will worsen if carbon prices 
increase.  Ultimately, a unified policy offers greater carbon reduction at a lower cost, 
which would increase popular acceptance of such policies.  Information from an 
online contingent-valuation survey is combined with the results of the electrical model 
to estimate willingness to pay for carbon abatement under different scenarios. 
 
 
I. Introduction 
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is a collection of northeastern 
states that have set up a carbon cap and trade system with the intention of limiting and 
ultimately reducing carbon emissions in New England, New York and part of the PJM 
Interconnect7.  However, the power grid in these states is not isolated from the rest of 
the country.  Because electrons and power flows obey physical laws separate from 
economic and political desires, increasing the costs of generation in the RGGI states 
may increase imports of power, particularly from unregulated fossil fuel units outside 
of RGGI.  Thus, the impact of CO2 emission prices in the RGGI states on total CO2 
emissions may be lessened when the total system emissions are considered.  An 
increase in CO2 emissions outside of a regulated area in response to regulation is often 
                                                
7 The PJM Interconnect is a Regional Transmission Organization named for three of its principal states: 
Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Maryland.  It has expanded to include all or parts of 13 states and the 
District of Columbia, from Michigan to North Carolina. 
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called “leakage.”  Currently, RGGI has no plans to deal with leakage, and due to the 
Commerce Clause, it may be impossible to stop this shift of power at all. 
Although the expected cost of CO2 in RGGI is not expected to be very high, it 
is important to consider the effect of higher prices than those found as a result of 
RGGI, because other policies may lead to higher prices.  For example, proposed 
national cap and trade programs for CO2 (such as the Waxman-Markey bill, also 
known as the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009) may result in very 
high carbon prices, on the order of $100/ton or more.  CO2 prices under the proposed 
Kerry-Lieberman bill (also known as the American Power Act) may exceed $50/tonne 
by 2026.  As Canadian units will not be incorporated in these US national policies, 
results from this analysis of RGGI may be illuminating as to the degree of leakage 
expected.  This model can also be used to estimate the impact states joining or leaving 
RGGI, as New Jersey has done at the start of 2012. 
Several studies of the effects of emissions programs have been conducted 
using other planning models, which are used to estimate the effects of policies on the 
electric grid.  For example, the EPA has used ICF’s Integrated Planning Model (2011) 
to examine the impacts of air emissions policies on the U.S. electric grid, including the 
Cross-State Air Pollution Rule and the Transport Rule.  However, while the IPM does 
have very detailed information about every generator in the United States including 
information about emissions for various pollutants, its transmission model lacks 
essential details.  The ICF breaks the continental United States down into a few dozen 
regions for analysis.  Within each region, transmission is unconstrained, and power 
flows between regions are constrained by aggregate flow limits.  This model ignores 
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the structure of the electric grid entirely, replacing it with a “bubbles and pipes” model 
for ease of analysis.8  The Resources for the Future Haiku model (Paul and Bertaw 
2002) also uses constraints between regions to model flow limits, and uses “46 model 
plants” to estimate generation technology.  These planning tools are useful, but may 
fail to capture the full impact of new policies because they ignore the realities of the 
electric grid. 
Most studies of carbon leakage have focused on general equilibrium effects 
resulting from trade in finished goods, and only a few studies have examined the 
effects of a bi-regional carbon cap and trade policy.  A study by Chen (2009) finds that 
for a DC model of a small part of the PJM system, which is part of RGGI, carbon 
leakage may approach 90% of abatement in the control area.  This study does not 
include investment and only models a small portion of the region, which may 
overstate the impact of leakage.  Fowlie (2009) uses an oligopoly with two crude 
transmission constraints to represent California.  She shows that this bi-regional policy 
achieves only a third of the emissions reductions as a unified policy with double the 
emissions cost. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, I 
provide an overview of the optimization problem solved to optimize investment and 
generator dispatch.  A description of the network model for the electric grid and the 
information about the generators is also provided.  In the third section, I review the 
                                                
8 A bubbles and pipes model breaks the electric grid into regions – bubbles.  Within each region, flows 
are unconstrained, and between each region, there is a single “pipe” with a flow limit standing in for all 
flow between the regions.  Because power flows over all lines available for use, intraregional flow 
limits may limit interregional flows.  Power flows into New York state are often limited by 
intraregional flows to New York City from other regions in New York, not intraregional lines from 
Canada or New England.  
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results of the simulation for the carbon leakage cases.  The fourth section discusses the 
results of a novel online contingent valuation experiment from which information 
about willingness to pay is drawn.  The fifth section presents a unified model to 
illustrate various levels of acceptance for bi-regional and unified carbon cap and trade 
programs.  Conclusions and discussions are provided in the final section. 
 
II. Model Description and Data 
To simulate actual real electricity generation and capacity investment in a 
power market, the following optimization problem is solved: 
 
 
i: generator index 
j: node index 
k: representative hour index 
pijk: aggregate real power output from generator i at node j during 
 representative hour k 
p0ij: existing generator capacity 
Rij: capacity retirement 
Iij: capacity investment 
cFi: cost of fuel, operations and maintenance per MWh 
cTi: cost of taxes and insurance per MW 
cIi: annualized cost of new investment 
54 
Hk: hours system is at load profile k 
ei: emissions vector for generation type I, tonnes/MWh 
ajk: emissions cost vector at node j in hour k, $/tonne 
!mini: min generation for type i 
Kij: max investment in fuel type I at node j 
Bjk: Benefit function for demand response  
Ljk: Net load 
 
The objective function aims to maximize the net benefits of the value of 
generation minus the sum of power and fixed costs, subject to active power flow 
equations and transmission, generation, voltage and other constraints.9  Since we are 
using a DC approximation of an AC system, we can ignore costs and constraints 
involving reactive power and voltage angles.  A DC approximation is a good model 
for these purposes (Schulze, 2009), and also ensures the problem is linear, which aids 
in computational tractability. 
Each year is split into sixteen representative hours: four representative hours 
for each season.  Figure 2.1 shows the percentage of the year modeled by each 
representative hour.  The summer representative hours make up a greater portion of 
the year relative to the other seasons because in this model, summer comprises more 
months than any other season: May through September, which coincides with the 
EPA’s Ozone Season under the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule.  The fall and spring 
                                                
9 This step of the analysis was performed using the SuperOPF and MATPOWER, a collection of 
MATLAB M-files for solving “stochastic, contingency-based, security-constrained optimal power 
flow[s].”  The MATPOWER home page can be found at: http://www.pserc.cornell.edu/matpower.  The 
SuperOPF is still under development.  In terms of the terminology in the SuperOPF, the different 
representative hours are treated as contingencies from the base case (summer peak), and the Positive 
Active Reserve Price is the fixed cost or the investment cost, depending on if the generator is an 
existing unit or a new (potential) unit.  Since we are representing an entire year with each contingency 
instead of the normal time frame of the SuperOPF, ramp rates are unimportant, and each generator has 
ramp rates equal to its maximum power output.  However, to keep coal plants from cycling on and off 
between seasons, their minimum contracted power is set to 15% of PMAX. 
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hours comprise two months each: October and November, and March and April, with 
the remaining three months falling into the winter category. 
 
FIGURE 2.1: Relative Frequency of Representative Hour Types 
 
Each representative hour is modeled as a deviation from the base case 
(Summer Peak).  Generators can be de-rated, to reduce their maximum power 
capacity, load can be scaled (separately for each area in the model) and different 
emissions costs can be applied.  Figure 2.2 presents an average of the load scaling 
across all regions for each representative hour.  The Summer Peak has the highest total 
system demand.  Most regions experience their peak demand at the summer peak due 
to summer cooling needs.  The Maritimes in Canada, however, actually has its annual 
peak during the winter.  Investment in units, especially new units needed to meet this 
peak demand (often called peaking units), is driven by this representative hour.  
Although the summer peak represents only a small portion of total hours, there must 
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be enough capacity on hand to provide for this demand, since storage on a utility scale 
is prohibitively expensive with current technology.  In the real world, there exist 
peaking units that are only used for a few hours for a few days each year, usually on 
hot afternoons in July and August. 
 
 
FIGURE 2.2: Average Demand Assumptions for Representative Hour Types 
 
Accurate modeling of costs arising from emission policies is central to the 
accuracy of this paper.  Many emissions laws in the United States propose cap-and-
trade programs, which operate by putting a cap on the total amount of emissions, 
distributing emissions allowances, usually by endowment or auction, and establishing 
a permit market with a price for these permits.  A firm that expects to exceed its 
emissions allotment based on the number of allowances it owns may reduce emissions 
or purchase additional permits.  Firms are expected to minimize the costs of these two 
options to maximize their profits.  A cap-and-trade program, like an emissions tax 
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(which places a tax on each unit of emissions), puts a price on each unit of emissions.  
Examining the response of the power industry to a price on emissions allows us to 
predict the effect of a cap-and-trade program as well as an emission tax program.  The 
term “emissions price” is used to refer to either the permit price in a cap-and-trade 
program or the emission tax rate.  Firms that are endowed with permits should still 
value their opportunity cost even if they represent windfall earnings. 
The structure of emissions programs in the United States was changed 
drastically in 2010 following the issuance of the Transport Rule by the EPA, which 
almost immediately caused the price of SO2 permits in the Acid Rain Program to fall 
to near zero by replacing the Clean Air Interstate Rule.  The Acid Rain Program has 
been succeeded by four separate trading programs under the Cross-State Air Pollution 
Rules.  For the purposes of the leakage analysis, only New York, Pennsylvania and 
New Jersey are affected, and three different emissions policies must be modeled: 
annual SO2, annual NOX and seasonal (summer) ozone.  According to EPA estimates, 
affected units will pay $1,000/ton of SO2 in 2012, rising to $1,100/ton in 2014.  
Annual NOX emissions will cost $500 in 2012, rising to $600 in 2014.  During the 
summer ozone season, affected units will pay $1,300/ton of NOX in 2012 and 
$1,500/ton in 2014.  The first two policies are included by increasing the cost function 
in equation (2) for all affected units, while the final policy is modeled by increasing 
the cost function for affected units only during the four summer representative hours.  
As with most regulations affecting power generating units, only units with a 
generation capacity greater than 25 MW are affected.  (Which in itself may produce 
some leakage, though that is not the focus of this paper.)  Interestingly, these new 
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rules may serve to mitigate some of the leakage resulting from RGGI, since generating 
units in Pennsylvania and New Jersey will have to pay for these permits, but other 
generating units in New England do not. 
Information about fixed and investment costs for generation plants, as well as 
information about operating costs for new plants was obtained from the Energy 
Information Administration (2011).  Four types of new plants were selected to be 
built: dual unit advanced pulverized coal, advanced natural gas combined cycle, dual 
unit nuclear, and onshore wind.  These four plants represent efficient versions of four 
of the most common types of electric power used in the United States for which 
investment is possible.  The overnight cost reported by the EIA was converted into a 
total cost by assuming an equal portion of the overnight cost was spent at the 
beginning of each year, and the debt accrued interest at an annual rate of 8%.  A power 
plant can be expected to pay back its investment in the first 10 years of operation, so a 
capital recovery factor was calculated using equation (4). 
 
CRF: Capital Recovery Factor 
i: Interest Rate (8%) 
n: Compounding Periods (10 Years) 
 
For ten years and an annual interest rate of 8%, a plant is built if it can cover 
14.9% of the total construction cost in the first year of operation.  Generation costs 
 
 
 
 (4) 
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assume prevailing rates for fuels are the same as the average in the region for 2010: 
$5.56/thousand cubic feet for NG and $2.82/MBTU for coal.  In line with DOE 
estimates, natural gas prices increase by about 20% in 2022, and a further 23% in 
2032.  Coal prices decrease slightly (98% of 2012 costs) in 2022, and increase 4% 
from that value by 2032.  Total capacity additions are limited to 15% of the maximum 
rate in a 5-year period in which each type of fuel has, historically, been built.  This 
corresponds to the NPCC’s share of total US electrical generation.  For example, 
between 1985 and 1990, approximately 34 GW of nuclear capacity was built in the 
United States.  Thus, 5 GW is a conservative upper limit for the nuclear capacity that 
could be built by 2022 in the NPCC.  Information about new construction is 
summarized in Table 2.1. 
TABLE 2.1: Information about New Generators 
Fuel Type Capital 
Recovery/Year 
$/MW 
Total Variable Cost 
$/MWh 
Total Possible 
Capacity Additions 
Coal $497,201 $29.05 10 GW 
Natural Gas $181,824 $39.05 32 GW 
Wind* $392,322 $0 3.5 GW 
Nuclear $1,141,454 $2.04 5 GW 
*Wind assumes an average capacity factor of 33%, excluding federal and state 
incentives. 
 
The distribution of demand and the tradeoff between fixed and variable cost 
drives the investment and maintenance of different kinds of units.  For example, 
roughly 30% of the year has an expected load at about half of peak load: The low 
demand case for each season in Figures 2.1 and 2.2.  (And the entire year has a 
demand at half of peak load or more.)  For a power plant running 8,760 hours a year, 
total costs for an average fossil-fuel plant range from a low of $356,000/MW for a 
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coal plant to over $2.5 million dollars/MW for an oil plant.   However, if a plant is 
only running for the summer peak, 184 hours a year, the average natural gas plant 
costs under $28,000/MW to operate, cheaper than any other plant type except for 
hydropower. 
This analysis uses a network reduction of the Northeastern United States 
developed by Allen, Lang and Ilic (2008.)  A diagram of this network is shown in 
Figure 2.3.  Each point on this diagram represents a bus in the network, which are both 
numbered and named by the independent system operator or planning authority.  The 
spatial layout of the busses roughly corresponds to their geographic location.  The two 
lone busses at the top of the figure are Hydro Quebec and New Brunswick.  The five 
busses at the left side correspond to Ontario, which connect into the western New 
York System.  The entire middle of the diagram and the bottom right correspond to 
busses in New York, which connect to Pennsylvania and New Jersey (at the bottom 
left) and New England (at the middle right.)  The lines connecting these busses 
correspond to the actual or equivalenced lines in the real world.  In this work, Allen et 
al reduced the Northeast Power Coordinating Committee area to a 36 bus10 model, 
while maintaining important line flow constraints.  Data on existing generating units, 
provided by Energy Visuals, came from the 2006 reliability planning process of the 
Multiregional Modeling Working Group, and includes data on units projected to be 
operational in the summer of 2008.  In addition to information about fixed and 
variable costs, the model also has information about CO2, SO2 and NOX emissions 
rates for each power plant.  For more details about this process, see Schulze et al 
                                                
10 A bus is one node on the network, usually containing both load (customers) and generating units and 
connected to other busses via transmission lines. 
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(2009.)  Information about the physical location of each plant was used to determine 
whether the RGGI CO2 prices would be applied.  Plants at busses in New England, 
New York, Maryland and Delaware are part of RGGI.  Those in Canada, Pennsylvania 
are not.  New Jersey is currently part of RGGI, but has announced intentions to leave 
by the end of 2011.  Models were run both with New Jersey included and excluded 
from RGGI. 
The benefits function for demand response is based off the long-run elasticity 
and growth rates for elasticity.  As electricity prices increase, whether due to natural 
growth of the system, or to added costs to generation from emissions prices, people 
will respond by cutting back their level of power consumption.  In the long run, the 
elasticity of demand for electricity is approximately -1 (Dahl, 1993).  However, recent 
research suggests that, even in the short run, the elasticity of people responding to 
average prices (ie, utility bills) is -0.982 (Fell et all, 2011).  Since each step of our 
model represents 10 years, an elasticity of -1 is used to represent demand response.  
Average distribution costs are assumed to be $70/MWh.  In the NPCC, the average 
LMP for the base year is also $70/MWh.  Thus, $140/MWh is a good estimate for 
retail prices.  A 2.5% reduction in demand would be expected as prices increased to 
$143.50, or an increase in LMP from $70 to $73.50.  Because this optimization 
problem must remain a linear program, demand response is represented in ten blocks, 
each representing 2.5% of total load.  The effective price for each block of demand 
response is at the midpoint of each interval. 
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FIGURE 2.3.  Diagram of 36-bus model from Allen et al (2008). 
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III. Carbon Leakage 
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is a collection of states and 
provinces in the Northeastern United States and Canada that have set up a regional 
cap-and-trade system for CO2 emissions.  Ten states are participants in RGGI, 
meaning they take part in the emissions cap-and-trade market, while Pennsylvania and 
several Canadian provinces are observers.  One of the participant states, New Jersey, 
has announced plans to leave RGGI by the end of 2011.  The states and provinces 
involved in RGGI are depicted in Figure 2.4.  The aim of the Regional Greenhouse 
Gas Initiative is to first stabilize carbon emissions from 2009-2014, then gradually 
decrease the emissions cap from 2015-2019 until a 10% reduction is achieved.  
However, because of increases in energy efficiency and the recent recession, 
emissions are already below past levels, and it is the price floor on permits rather than 
the emissions cap that determines prices for CO2. 
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FIGURE 2.4: Map of RGGI States 
 
To model the effect of bi-regional and unified carbon dioxide policies over 
time on total carbon dioxide production, a number of scenarios were simulated.  To 
estimate the effects of varying CO2 prices on carbon leakage in RGGI, CO2 prices of 
$0 to $100/tonne were applied to units in RGGI in $5 increments.  The same CO2 
prices were also applied to all units, to compare the cost of emissions reduction for bi-
region model versus a unified emissions market.  These analyses were both done in 
2012 and 2022, allowing one investment cycle.  To estimate the effects of the EPA 
rules and New Jersey leaving RGGI, a number of additional simulations were run.  
These simulations are summarized below. 
The columns of Table 2.2 vary the emissions rules applied to RGGI.  Four 
cases are simulated, with two CO2 prices for RGGI, $0 and $1.89/tonne, and two 
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applications of the new EPA rules, whether they are present or not.  LMP is locational 
marginal price, and is the marginal price of electricity at each node in the network.  
Because of transmission constraints, electricity prices can vary across the network.  
Average LMP is a load and duration weighted average of prices across the network for 
a year. The first column in the table, $1.89 RGGI CO2, EPA Rules, is the best 
prediction for the state of the NPCC in 2012.  The other columns can be used to 
estimate the effect of the RGGI cap and trade program and the new EPA rules.  
Compared to having no regulations, CO2 emissions are expected to be 4.22 
megatonnes lower, though emissions will be about 4.46 megatonnes lower in RGGI, 
which means that 240,000 extra tonnes of CO2 are produced in the non-affected units, 
and 5% of emissions reductions are undone by leakage.  The EPA regulations and 
RGGI have a synergistic effect. Both policies together reduce CO2 more than the sum 
of each policy individually, while wholesale prices (LMP) increase less than the sum 
of increases for either policy.  The EPA rules also reduce leakage: leakage is 6% of 
RGGI CO2 reductions in the $1.89 RGGI and EPA Rules case, but 20% in the RGGI 
price alone case.  Of course, as CO2 prices increase, the difference between generator 
prices inside and outside of RGGI will increase, while the price of SO2 and NOX may 
stay relatively stable if emissions are switching from covered SO2 and NOX units 
inside of RGGI to outside of RGGI. 
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  TABLE 2.2: Summary information about the effects of variations in environmental 
regulations on CO2 emissions 
  
$1.89 
RGGI CO2 
$1.89 RGGI 
CO2 
$0 RGGI 
CO2 
$0 RGGI 
CO2 
  EPA Rules 
No EPA 
Rules EPA Rules 
No EPA 
Rules 
Total CO2 
(Megatonnes) 241.74 244.15 244.63 245.96 
RGGI CO2 
(Megatonnes) 98.14 100.31 101.9 102.6 
Average LMP 
70.17 69.63 69.67 69.31 
$/MWh 
RGGI LMP 
72.1 71.62 71.53 71.13 
$/MWh 
          
Total CO2 Reduction 4.22 1.81 1.33   
RGGI CO2 Reduction 4.46 2.28 0.69   
 
Table 2.3 shows summary information about the effects of New Jersey leaving 
RGGI at the end of 2011.  The first column has New Jersey not in RGGI, and the 
second has New Jersey still included in RGGI.  The third column has New Jersey 
included in RGGI for the sake of emissions prices, but not included in RGGI for 
tallying CO2 emissions.  This is to examine the effect of including New Jersey on 
RGGI emissions, while adjusting for the effect that merely including New Jersey will 
have on program emissions, regardless of the emissions reductions from RGGI.  
Including New Jersey in RGGI decreases CO2 emissions by 140,000 tonnes, though it 
increases emissions by 370,000 tonnes in the rest of RGGI.  Most likely, this is 
because the average generating unit in New Jersey produces 0.8729 tonnes of 
CO2/MWh, while the average unit in the rest of RGGI produces 0.8268 tonnes of 
CO2/MWh.  When New Jersey is included in RGGI, some generation shifts from the 
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relatively more polluting units in New Jersey to other, less polluting units in RGGI.  
Some of the effect is also due to the slightly reduced load because of the increase in 
prices, both in RGGI and in the rest of the region. 
 
TABLE 2.3: Summary information about the effects of New Jersey’s RGGI status on 
CO2 emissions 
NJ In RGGI? No Yes Yes* 
      
NJ CO2 Not 
counted in 
RGGI 
Total CO2 
(megatonnes) 241.74 241.6 241.6 
RGGI CO2 
(megatonnes) 98.14 114.62 98.51 
Average LMP 70.17 70.22 70.22 
RGGI LMP 72.1 72.22 72.16 
 
Next, this paper will look at the impact of leakage as CO2 prices increase.  
Figure 2.5 illustrates the result of a range of prices in RGGI on CO2 emissions for the 
entire region and the power plants in RGGI states.  Although the actual emissions 
prices are very low in RGGI, on the order of $1.89/tonne (the current price floor), 
these simulation results illustrate the leakage that may result from prices high enough 
to substantially reduce carbon emissions, which RGGI does not currently do.  
Although increasing carbon prices on RGGI units does reduce total system CO2, there 
is an offsetting effect from non-RGGI units, which increase their power output and 
thus their CO2 emissions.  When CO2 permit prices increase from $0 to $100/tonne, 
total CO2 emissions drop from 244 megatonnes to 176 megatonnes, a decline of 68 
megatonnes (28%.)  However, RGGI emissions drop by 87 megatonnes, and non-
RGGI units increase their emissions by 18 megatonnes.  This leakage appears to 
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decline as CO2 prices increase.  This decline is due to both transmission limits and 
generation limits.  As CO2 prices increase, two inter-region lines are at a limit: 
Maritimes/Maine and Ontario/New York.  As well, two intra-RGGI lines in New York 
are at their limit.  Even if sufficient transmission capacity were available, the non-
covered units can only generate 68 GW of power, against a summer peak load of 120 
GW, which can be reduced to as little as 90 GW with demand response.  Nuclear, 
wind and hydropower units in the RGGI states add another 18 GW of power.  Of 
course, even with very high CO2 prices, efficient units in RGGI will still be 
dispatched.  At CO2 prices of $100/tonne, an average natural gas plant producing 0.65 
tonnes of CO2/MWh with a cost of $72/MWh before CO2 prices will cost $137/MWh 
to operate, much less than the average oil plant or the worst coal plant, even if no 
emissions prices are applied to those units. 
 
FIGURE 2.5: CO2 Emissions from a range of CO2 prices charged to RGGI units in 
2012 
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Figure 2.6 shows three average cost curves for summer peak generation.  The 
two curves for RGGI show the different amounts of generation available at $0/tonne 
and $100/tonne CO2 prices, while the non-RGGI curve is not affected by RGGI CO2 
prices.  The large vertical step before 20 GW for RGGI and 30 GW for Non-RGGI 
units is the point at which low-cost hydro, wind and nuclear units are fully dispatched 
and fossil-fuel units start to come online.  For any given price of electricity, this figure 
would show the relative amounts of RGGI and non-RGGI capacity used (in the 
absence of transmission constraints.)  Figure 2.7 presents total aggregate generator 
cost curves for three carbon prices and applications: no carbon price, a $100/tonne 
RGGI price, and a $100/tonne price on all units, along with the summer peak load, 
including demand response, which is why the demand curve is downward sloping 
between approximately $150/MWh and $200/MWh.  Note that the LMP at summer 
peak is higher than the average LMP for the year, regardless of CO2 prices.  Imposing 
a carbon price on all units instead of just RGGI units appears to mainly shift up the 
bottom end of the curve, around 50 GW, while not substantially affecting prices at 
summer peak levels.  This may mean a unified carbon cap and trade policy would 
have a relatively greater effect on prices during low demand hours than at any other 
time. 
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FIGURE 2.6: Aggregate Generator Cost Curves for RGGI and Non-RGGI Units in 
2012 
 
 
FIGURE 2.7: Supply and Demand Curves for Electricity at Summer Peak Load (In the 
absence of transmission constraints) 
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Figures 2.8 and 2.9 show how the capacity and generation of fossil-fuel 
sources of power in the NPCC and in RGGI change as the carbon price in RGGI 
increases.  (Non-fossil fuel generators are not affected, as they all have very low 
marginal costs and are fully dispatched by the model.)  The main effect of higher CO2 
prices on capacity is that less coal capacity is used starting around $30/tonne, and that 
all existing coal capacity in RGGI is left idle once CO2 prices reach $70/tonne.  Coal 
generation confirms this trend, as the slope of coal generation changes once the 
$30/tonne price is hit, because the decline in coal generation prior to $30/tonne is from 
using existing generators less, and the decline after $30/tonne is from shutting down 
generators.  (Since any coal generator must use at least 15% of its rated maximum 
power at all times, coal generators can not only be used during peak demand periods.)  
Natural gas generation in RGGI also declines to approximately 1/3 of its $0/tonne 
level as CO2 prices increase, but the change in total natural gas generation is less than 
the change in RGGI natural gas generation, as units outside of RGGI increase their 
output from 50 TWh to a max of 74 TWh at $70/tonne CO2 prices.  Non-RGGI coal 
generators only increase their output by 2 TWh.  Most of the carbon leakage is coming 
as generation shifts from coal and natural gas plants in RGGI to natural gas plants 
outside RGGI. 
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FIGURE 2.8: Fossil fuel capacity for a range of RGGI CO2 Prices in 2012 
 
 
FIGURE 2.9: Fossil fuel generation for a range of RGGI CO2 Prices in 2012 
 
The 2022 chart of CO2 prices versus carbon output (Figure 2.10) shows 
broadly similar results to increasing carbon prices when investment is allowed.  The 
intercepts at $0/tonne are shifted downwards slightly, which shows that investment in 
lower-carbon generating sources happens regardless of CO2 prices: there is 12 GW of 
new investment even at $0/tonne.  New natural gas combined cycle units are, in 
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addition to being cheaper to operate, relatively lower in carbon emissions.  However, 
leakage is a larger concern when new investment is allowed.  As CO2 prices rise to 
$100/tonne, RGGI emissions drop by 80.2 megatonnes, but non-RGGI emissions 
increase by 21.1 megatonnes.  In 2012, an 87.2 megatonne drop by RGGI units only 
resulted in an 18.6 megatonne increase from non-RGGI units. 
 
FIGURE 2.10: CO2 Emissions from a range of RGGI CO2 Prices in 2022 
 
Figures 2.11 and 2.12 explain part of the reduced leakage.  As in 2012, non-
fossil fuel generators are omitted because there is no change in capacity or generation 
as CO2 prices increase.  Existing natural gas capacity is kept mostly intact, with about 
11% (3 GW) of existing RGGI units decommissioned once prices get above 
$80/tonne.  Likewise, the 9 GW of coal capacity in RGGI is taken offline at CO2 
prices above $70/tonne.  For new natural gas plants, 12 GW is built regardless of CO2 
prices, half in RGGI and half outside of RGGI.  As CO2 prices increase, the total 
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amount built increases, and the ratio shifts to include more new natural gas plants built 
outside of RGGI.  At CO2 prices of $100/tonne, over 16 GW of new natural gas 
capacity is built, almost 90% of that outside RGGI.  Building more efficient newer 
plants in response to shutting down coal generation produces less leakage per plant 
than running older, less efficient more often, but more total leakage is present when 
investment is allowed. 
 
FIGURE 2.11: Fossil Fuel Capacity for a range of RGGI CO2 prices in 2022 
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FIGURE 2.12: Fossil Fuel Generation for a range of RGGI CO2 prices in 2022 
 
Figure 2.13 summarizes the magnitude of carbon leakage as a result of 
regionally limited carbon prices in 2012 and 2022.  The quantity charted is the total 
CO2 increases in the non-RGGI units divided by the total CO2 decreases from the 
RGGI units, or what percent of total RGGI CO2 emissions non-covered units 
increasing output undo.  Leakage is a greater concern at lower CO2 prices – it reaches 
a maximum at $5 or $10/tonne in 2012 and 2022 respectively, then has a general 
downward trend as CO2 prices increase.  The spike in 2022 leakage from $5-$10/tonne 
is due to a number of factors.  First, total CO2 abatement by RGGI units at this stage is 
small – about 6% of total CO2 emissions, so small changes have larger percentage 
effects.  In general, RGGI units see a reduction in total generation of about 10 TWh 
for every $5 increase in CO2 prices at first, which quickly tapers off to 7-8 TWh/$5 
increase, and gradually decreases to about 1TWh/$5 increase as prices approach 
$100/tonne.  Non-RGGI units generally increase their generation by about 5 TWh/$5 
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increase in CO2 prices, which tapers to a 1TWh/$5 increase as CO2 prices increase 
past $50/tonne.  However, as CO2 prices increase from $5 to $10/tonne, the output of 
non-RGGI units increases by 10 TWh, mostly due to newly constructed natural gas 
plants.  This is the largest increase in total generation and generation from new units in 
the sample, 50% above the next largest increase.  It also reflects an increase in the 
average capacity factor of new natural gas units, from 68% at $0 and $5/tonne to 75% 
at $10/tonne. 
 
FIGURE 2.13: Leakage as a Percent of RGGI Carbon Reductions 
 
Finally, to look at the effects of a unified emissions policy, the same analysis is 
repeated with a CO2 price applied to every unit greater than 25 MW in the NPCC.    
Figures 2.14 and 2.15 compare this policy with RGGI.  RGGI emissions are shown for 
each case as a comparison, though are not as important in the unified emissions price 
policy.  First, note the unified policy is dramatically better at reducing total emissions.  
At high prices, total CO2 emissions can fall to less than 40% of original levels, 
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compared to 72% for RGGI-only emissions prices.  The bulk of the units outside of 
RGGI are located in Pennsylvania, which relies heavily on coal generation, so there is 
more room for improvement when these units are included in addition to RGGI units. 
 
FIGURE 2.14: Comparison of CO2 emissions versus CO2 prices in 2012 for two 
emissions costs applications 
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FIGURE 2.15: Comparison of CO2 emissions versus CO2 prices in 2022 for two 
emissions costs applications 
 
Figures 2.16 and 2.17 confirm this hypothesis. As CO2 prices increase and coal 
generation falls, the bulk of the reductions are not occurring in RGGI, especially in 
2022.  In 2012, 63% of the reduction in coal at CO2 prices of $100/tonne occurs 
outside of RGGI, and in 2022, that increases to 67%.  At the same time, at least half of 
new natural gas plants built are outside of RGGI.  This proportion increases as the 
price of carbon increases.  As with the rest of the charts of capacity and generation, 
there is no change in the non fossil fuel plants, and little change in the oil plants. 
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FIGURE 2.16: Coal and Natural Gas Capacity for a range of CO2 prices with a unified 
emissions price policy in 2012 
 
 
FIGURE 2.17: Coal and Natural Gas capacity for a range of CO2 prices with a unified 
emissions price policy in 2022 
 
IV. Online Contingent Valuation Survey 
Earlier research (Ho et al, 2011) conducted an online contingent valuation 
survey regarding willingness to pay for carbon abatement.  Survey respondents were 
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drawn from The StudyResponse Project, a nationwide panel of 95,574 people.  520 
panelists were invited to participate, and 420 completed surveys were received, for an 
81% response rate.  However, for this application, only the 79 respondents in the 
control group are used.  The treatment group in the Ho et al study focused on 
examining the WTP of individuals depending on their relative culpability – the 
difference between their carbon footprint and a stated average.  The control group was 
given no information about the difference between their carbon emissions.  The actual 
contingent valuation question is shown in Figure 2.18.  Although the contingent 
valuation question was stated with a constant marginal cost for abating carbon 
emissions, I assume that it is the extra cost per year people care about, not the actual 
levels of carbon emissions averted. 
 
FIGURE 2.18: WTP question from online survey 
 
Table 2.4 displays summary statistics for these individuals.  Participants with 
any missing observations or who had obvious outlier answers to their carbon footprint 
questions were dropped.  The variables included are CO2 Total, a carbon footprint 
estimated from information provided in the survey; NEP, a measure of environmental 
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attitudes, from the New Ecological Paradigm (Dunlap et al 2000) to create a 55-point 
variable from 10 5-point Likert scale questions; politics, a binary variable for self-
reported political status; children, a binary for the presence of children in the 
household; gender, a binary for gender; age; income: household income in levels; 
Education, a binary for education status; and Democrat, a binary for party affiliation. 
TABLE 2.4: Summary information for participants in sample 
  Mean 
WTP (Lower bound) 143.33 (15.41) 
CO2 Total 
23.3 
(2.35) 
NEP 34.01 (0.81) 
Politics 0.75 (0.05) 
Children 0.58 (0.06) 
Gender 0.57 (0.06) 
Age 37.61 (1.17) 
Income 5.04 (0.23) 
Education 0.53 (0.06) 
Democrat 0.41 (0.06) 
N= 79 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Because the payment card response items are discrete and ordered, Cameron 
and Huppert’s (1989) interval modeling format extension is used.  This model assumes 
that selecting a particular threshold value provides the lower bound of a willingness to 
pay (WTP) interval, which is bounded by above by the next cost point.  The highest 
interval is an exception to this rule, since there is no stated upper bound.  The upper 
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bound for the highest interval was assumed to be $1,000/year.  Assuming a logistically 
distributed WTP function yields the following log likelihood function, equation (5): 
 
F(.) indicates the logistic distribution, Z is a vector of covariates, tiU is the 
upper bound of the interval selected, tiL is the lower bound of the interval selected, and 
the scale parameter " =  # ! !.  E(WTP) = $Z and var(WTP) = #2.  Table 2.5 shows 
the results of this maximum likelihood estimation.  NEP is the explanatory variable 
with the most predictive power, which is unsurprising.  People who have stronger 
feelings about the environment want to voluntarily spend more to abate carbon.  
Education, being liberal, having children, and age are also positively correlated with a 
greater willingness to pay. 
This estimation was then used to estimate median WTP for carbon abatement 
instead of a lower bound of WTP for carbon abatement.  This information is then used 
to calculate a distribution of willingness to pay for carbon abatement, depicted in 
Figure 2.19.  The maximum WTP is $337.09, and 50% of the sample would be willing 
to pay at least $165/year for carbon abatement. 
 
 
 
 
 
(5) 
83 
TABLE 2.5: MLE Results for Contingent Valuation Experiment 
Variable Coefficient 
Constant -127.41 (113.61) 
CO2 Footprint 0.58 (0.88) 
NEP 7.41*** (2.49) 
Politics 5.98 (38.02) 
Children 9.25 (35.85) 
Gender -23.46 (36.05) 
Age 0.42 (1.75) 
Income -2.82 (8.56) 
Education 48.17 (35.55) 
Theta 80.46*** (8.30) 
Observations 79 
Log Likelihood -176.44 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
All samples exclude outliers and observations with any missing values 
 
V. A Model of Public Acceptance for Bi-Regional and Unified Carbon Markets 
With the information from the previous two sections, a model for acceptance 
of bi-regional and unified carbon policies can now be constructed.  Section three gives 
us information about the relative costs of reducing CO2 emissions under the two policy 
regimes, while section four gives us information about willingness to pay for CO2 
abatement. 
 
 
84 
 
FIGURE 2.19: Distribution of WTP for carbon abatement 
 
First, to analyze of the effects of reducing CO2, regressions were run, 
regressing total CO2 emissions, RGGI CO2 emissions, or total wholesale prices on 
carbon emissions price and carbon emissions price squared.  The results from these 
regressions are shown in Tables 7 and 8.  These regressions fit the data very well with 
R2 of 0.96 or greater. 
With the information about WTP for carbon abatement, and the information 
about carbon emissions and prices in the NPCC, it is possible to calculate the 
maximum abatement under each price regime that a majority of the population would 
be willing to support, as well as what percentage of the population would be willing to 
pay for various carbon abatement policies.  According to the Energy Information 
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Administration, residential sales of electricity in 2010 were 1,450,759 million kWh 
(2011.)  At the same time, there were 112,611,029 households in the United States 
(Census, 2010).  This gives an average household consumption of 12,882 
kWh/household/year. 
Given a CO2 price, CO2 emissions and LMP can be calculated using the 
regression results in Tables 2.6 and 2.7.  Or, given a CO2 emissions target, the 
necessary CO2 price can be calculated, and from that, wholesale prices can be 
calculated.  With the new wholesale price, demand response can be calculated using 
the same -1 elasticity as in the SuperOPF.  Finally, with prices and consumption, total 
electricity expenditures can be calculated.  The sum of electricity expenditures and the 
value of lost load is compared with the original electricity expenditures (or expected 
electricity expenditures in 2022) at $0/tonne CO2 prices to calculate the additional cost 
per household of various CO2 emissions prices. 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2.6: Summary Results from Regressions of Total CO2 Output for various 
Emissions price applications in 2012 and 2022 
CO2 Price Application All RGGI All RGGI 
Year 2012 2012 2022 2022 
          
Constant 
251.902*** 
(3.581) 
248.038*** 
(1.397) 
244.952*** 
(3.880) 
240.957*** 
(1.613) 
CO2 Price 
-2.226*** 
(0.166) 
-1.347*** 
(0.065) 
-2.042*** 
(0.180) 
-1.302*** 
(0.075) 
CO2 Price2 
0.006*** 
(0.002) 
0.006*** 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.007*** 
(0.001) 
          
R2 0.9864 0.9902 0.9871 0.9829 
Standard Errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Three sets of results are presented in Table 2.8: a 10% CO2 reduction (the 
RGGI goal), a 17% CO2 reduction (the goal of the proposed Kerry-Lieberman and 
Waxman-Markey Bills) and a reduction that 50% of people would be willing to pay 
for.  In the first two cases, the unified policy is cheaper per affected individual and 
results in lower CO2 prices than the RGGI policy.  In the third case, all the costs are 
equal, and the unified cases have lower CO2 emissions, although CO2 prices are lower 
for the RGGI 2022 case.  Of course, the unified policy has a CO2 price applied to 
every unit in the NPCC, and more people are affected by the policy, so the extra cost 
per year is paid by more people.  But even if CO2 prices are charged only to generators 
in RGGI, the costs of electricity increase, even for those individuals not in a RGGI 
state.  This is because the marginal generating units become more expensive, whether 
because more expensive units are brought online in the non-RGGI region, or because 
the marginal units in RGGI are now charged for their CO2 emissions.  Also, policies 
are less expensive in 2022, as the addition of new generating units can lower the cost 
of compliance.  From the 10% and 17% goal cases, it is clear that any of the effective 
policies to limit CO2 emissions would not be approved if willingness to pay were the 
only criteria on which voters acted.  The last case shows what level of policies would 
be acceptable to the public: a 1-3% reduction in the near term and a 6-7% reduction in 
the medium term.  Over the long run, additional investment in new, efficient capacity 
might be expected to increase the amount of CO2 people would voluntarily choose to 
abate.  New types of power plants, such as carbon capture and storage plants might 
change these conclusions as well. 
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TABLE 2.7: Summary Results from Regressions of Total and RGGI Average LMP 
for various Emissions price applications in 2012 and 2022.   
Region All All RGGI RGGI 
Year 2012 2022 2012 2022 
          
Constant 
70.361*** 
(0.190) 
71.635*** 
(0.089) 
70.856*** 
(0.287) 
72.778*** 
(0.041) 
CO2 Price 
0.313*** 
(0.009) 
0.317*** 
(0.004) 
0.365*** 
(0.013) 
0.183*** 
(0.002) 
CO2 
Price2 
0.002*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0004*** 
(0.00004) 
-0.001*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0002*** 
(0.00002) 
          
R2 0.9997 0.9998 0.9998 0.9963 
Standard Errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
TABLE 2.8: Summary Results from Three Carbon Abatement Cases 
10% Reduction               
Model Year 
CO2 
Price 
CO2 
Emissions LMP Load 
Extra 
Cost per 
Year 
Carbon 
Abatement 
Percent 
Support 
Unified 2012 $14.85 220 $75.45 96.11% $337.47 10% 0.00% 
Unified 2022 $12.29 220 $75.53 96.05% $238.04 10% 12.65% 
RGGI 2012 $21.84 220 $78.35 94.04% $505.72 10% 0.00% 
RGGI 2022 $17.64 220 $76.01 95.71% $266.22 10% 5.06% 
17% Reduction               
Model Year 
CO2 
Price 
CO2 
Emissions LMP Load 
Extra 
Cost per 
Year 
Carbon 
Abatement 
Percent 
Support 
Unified 2012 $23.43 203 $78.79 93.72% $530.77 17% 0.00% 
Unified 2022 $20.96 203 $78.28 94.09% $397.65 17% 0.00% 
RGGI 2012 $39.23 203 $83.63 90.26% $792.69 17% 0.00% 
RGGI 2022 $36.15 203 $79.39 93.29% $460.41 17% 0.00% 
50% Approval Reduction             
Model Year 
CO2 
Price 
CO2 
Emissions LMP Load 
Extra 
Cost per 
Year 
Carbon 
Abatement 
Percent 
Support 
Unified 2012 $6.88 237 $72.61 98.14% $165.00 3.17% 50.63% 
Unified 2022 $8.44 228 $74.31 96.92% $165.00 6.85% 50.63% 
RGGI 2012 $4.87 242 $72.61 98.14% $165.00 1.12% 50.63% 
RGGI 2022 $8.37 231 $74.31 96.92% $165.00 5.76% 50.63% 
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VI. Conclusions 
 
Using a transmission-constrained model with actual generator data is essential 
for estimating impacts to the electric grid from large-scale policies.  Transmission and 
generation constraints are a factor for all of the analyses in this paper, and provide a 
more realistic picture of the effects of policies than the “bubbles and pipes” models 
commonly used which neglect intra-region transmission constraints and greatly 
simplify inter-region transmission. 
Under bi-regional emissions policies, leakage is a real concern.  With no 
investment in new capacity, 21-35% of carbon reductions are undone by increased 
emissions in the non-covered area.  After time for new investment, the situation is 
even worse, with at least 25% of carbon reductions undone by increased emissions.  
Relative levels of leakage are higher at low carbon prices, as generation and 
transmission constraints limit how much electricity can be imported, especially in 
already-congested areas.  Additionally, bi-regional policies make it more expensive to 
achieve emissions reductions of equal magnitude when compared to unified emissions 
regimes, making it more unlikely that they will be politically viable.  Assuming that 
all states have homogenous voter attitudes about climate change.  Some voters are 
more environmentally concerned and willing to take on greater costs for themselves in 
exchange for some emissions reductions.
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APPENDIX 
 
 
 In order to examine whether the increased computational complexity required 
by this reduced network model is justified by differences in results, this Appendix 
compares the results of the reduced network model to a bubbles and pipes model of 
the same network.  In the bubbles and pipes model, the 36 nodes are split into six 
bubbles: Ontario, Hydro-Quebec, New Brunswick, New York ISO, ISO New England 
and PJM.  In Figure 2.3, the Ontario region is the box labeled IMO in the upper left 
hand corner, which consists of 5 busses, 80001-81615.  The PJM region is in the lower 
left hand corner and represented by busses 1 and 5028.  The NYISO is the middle and 
bottom right corner, represented by 19 busses, from 74316 to 79800.    ISO New 
England is in the middle right side, represented by eight busses, 70002-73663.  Hydro-
Quebec and New Brunswick are represented by one bus each, 84819 and 87004 
respectively and in the upper right corner.  Transmission constraints between the 
regions are modeled with a single “pipe” that represents the sum of all flow constraints 
between the regions, while transmission constrains within each region are ignored. 
 Appendix Figure 1 summarizes the differences in predicted CO2 output (both 
total CO2 and RGGI CO2) for a range of RGGI prices between this network model and 
the bubbles and pipes model.  The amount of total CO2 emissions predicted by each 
model is very similar, with only an average difference of 0.16% in 2012 and -0.09% in 
2022, with a maximum deviation of 0.89%.  However, the amount of CO2 emissions in 
the RGGI states vary greatly between the two models.  In 2012, the average deviation 
is 5.96%, but the maximum deviation is 15.87%.  As the CO2 prices in RGGI increase, 
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the deviations between the models do as well.  This is consistent with earlier results 
that showed that intrazonal transmission constraints are the binding constraint when 
examining leakage, not interzonal transmission constraints.  In the case of RGGI 
emissions, it is often the transmission lines within New York state that limit the 
amount of generation that can moved to uncovered busses in Canada or PJM.  Because 
it lacks these intrazonal constraints, the bubbles and pipes model predicts an 
unrealistically high level of leakage (ie, more generation moving from RGGI to 
outside of RGGI) when compared to the reduced network model. 
 For analysis of policies that only result in minor changes from the real world, 
simpler models such as a bubbles and pipes framework provide an adequate modeling 
tool.  However, the further a system diverges from initial conditions, the more 
important better, more detailed models become.  
 
APPENDIX FIGURE 1: Differences in CO2  Emissions between Network and Bubbles 
and Pipes Model for a range of CO2 Prices 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
RELATIVE CULPABILITY IN CONTINGENT VALUATION AND 
LABORATORY EXPERIMENT OF WILLINGNESS TO PAY TO REDUCE 
NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES 
 
Benjamin Ho11, John Taber12, Greg Poe13, and Antonio Bento14 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 Recent large-scale field experiments have shown that peer information nudges 
can have significant effects on behavior, inducing people to reduce their production of 
negative externalities. Related work in psychology demonstrates that inducing feelings 
of personal culpability by showing people information about their peers can induce 
pro-social behavior. This study uses a contingent valuation experiment and a parallel 
lab experiment to further explore patterns of responses that have been suggested in the 
emerging literature on norm-based environmental interventions  The field–level 
finding of asymmetric responses between those whose environmental or group 
impacts are above or below the norm is found to be robust across decision settings.   
However, substantial heterogeneity in responses to peer information is observed across 
a number of demographic and other respondent–specific dimensions not able to be 
                                                
11 Department of Economics, Blodgett Hall 125, Vassar College, Poughkeepsie, NY 12604.  Email: 
benho@vassar.edu 
12 Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management, Warren Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 
14853.  Email: jtt24@cornell.edu 
13 Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management, Warren Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 
14853.  Email: glp2@cornell.edu 
14 Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management, Warren Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 
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explored in large scale field experiments, raising questions about the universality of 
peer-information effects and the design of such programs. 
 
 
I. Introduction 
Recent large-scale field experiments demonstrate that peer comparisons and 
social-norm nudges are effective tools for inducing the conservation of privately 
purchased goods that collectively create negative public externalities.  Randomized 
residential electricity experiments that have monitored energy use and informed 
households of their personal consumption levels relative to a neighborhood norm 
provide evidence that energy consumers significantly reduce their energy consumption 
relative to a control group that does not receive such comparative information (Ayers 
et al. 2009; Allcott and Mullainathan, 2010; Costa and Kahn, 2010; Allcott, 2011).   
Such behavioral change-based interventions, as opposed to more traditional price 
instruments, can indeed be powerful, especially amongst specific groups of the 
population. Ferraro and Price (2011), for example, study the effects of providing non-
price interventions for household water use and find that, in the short run at least, the 
social-comparison effect is equivalent to that which would be expected if average 
prices were to increase by 12 to 15 percent; in a study of residential electricity 
consumption, Ayers et al. (2009) estimate that non-price, peer comparison intervention 
induce the equivalent consumption response as a 17 to 29 percent price increase. 
 While the average treatment effect has been shown to be significant, it is 
apparent that there is variation in response patterns to norm-based interventions.  
Notably, in a localized study of 290 households, Schultz et al. (2007) demonstrate that 
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social-norm nudges may create a “boomerang effect” in the sense that below average 
consumption households may actually increase their energy consumption when they 
are informed that their baseline consumption is below the average of their peer group.   
In this same study, high-energy users significantly decreased their electricity 
consumption levels relative to the baseline, as expected from the focus theory of 
normative behavior (Cialdini et al., 1991). This asymmetry in treatment effects has 
been replicated, to an extent, in large-scale field experiments with observations 
ranging from 75,000 to 600,000 households.  However, rather than observing a strong 
boomerang effect that increases consumption, there more commonly seems to be a 
zero, or muted negative, effect on consumption patterns of low-use households.  
Allcott (2011) estimates that social-norm treatment effects are not significantly 
different from zero for the lowest three deciles of baseline electricity users, but that 
there is a significant mean treatment effect in high-use households ranging from about 
-3.7% for the 8th decile to over -7% in the 10th decile. Ayers et al. (2009) similarly find 
no significant treatment effect on two out of lowest three deciles of baseline electricity 
use (the second decile had a significant treatment effect of approximately +1%), while 
consumption levels significantly decline by about -3% to -7% for the top three 
baseline energy deciles.   In a regression framework, Ferraro and Price (2011) estimate 
that the “social norm effect for our high user group is approximately 94.1 percent 
greater (5.28 versus 2.72 percent relative reduction) than for our low user group – a 
difference that is significant at the p<0.005 level.”  In all, while strong boomerang 
effects may not be evident, there does appear to be an important asymmetry in 
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responses to social-norm interventions between households with above and below 
norm consumption levels.  
Moreover, although responsiveness to norm-based messages have been 
demonstrated in a number of domains (e.g. Frey and Meier, 2004; Cialdini et al., 2006; 
Salganik, Dodds, and Watts, 2006; Cai, Chen, and Fang, 2009) recent research in the 
energy-social norms literature suggests that non-pecuniary effects may not be as 
universal as previously thought.  Different socio-economic groups may have 
heterogeneous responsiveness to peer information.  In interpreting these results, Costa 
and Kahn (2010) argue that: 
“behavioral economists have underestimated the role that ideological 
heterogeneity plays in determining the effectiveness of energy conservation 
“nudges”… we find that liberals and environmentalists are more responsive to 
these nudges than the average person.  In contrast, for certain subsets of 
Republican Registered voters, we find that the specific “treatment nudge” that 
we evaluate has the unintended consequence of increasing electricity 
consumption.”  (p. 2) 
 
In this paper we show that such asymmetric and heterogeneous responsiveness 
is also manifested in contingent valuation and laboratory economics experiments in 
which we can control the normative information that the subject receives.  Along the 
lines of Bateman et al. (2008), who demonstrated parallelism between contingent 
valuation responses and “inconsistencies…found in everyday decisions involving real 
commitments” (p. 125), we argue that evidence of convergent behaviors across 
methods lends validity to each.  Further, the survey application allows us to explore 
whether heterogeneity in response patterns occurs in demographic and other 
respondent-specific dimensions not able to be explored in large-scale field tests.  The 
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laboratory experiment permits exogenous control of the individual’s impact, avoiding 
possible endogeneity effects that may arise in field and contingent valuation studies.  
 The contingent valuation study calculates the carbon footprint of a nationally 
representative sample of consumers by asking questions about their energy-related 
consumption habits. A carbon footprint is defined to be the number of tons of carbon 
dioxide emissions an individual is personally responsible for based upon his or her 
energy consumption decisions in a given year. We then provide subjects in the 
treatment group information about how their carbon footprint compares to those of 
others in the study and elicit willingness to purchase green electricity to induce a 
feeling of relative culpability.  In an effort to parallel the field contingent valuation 
study, the laboratory experiment has student subjects purchase “private commodities” 
(analogous to electricity) that generate a negative externality (analogous to pollution) 
for a group in which they are a member.  A treatment group is given information about 
the private, pollution generating choices of others and the subjects are subsequently 
given an opportunity to contribute to a fund that would reduce the negative harm 
created by the externality. In the taxonomy of Harrison and List (2004) we present 
results from a framed field experiment coupled with a conventional laboratory 
experiment. 
Beyond demonstrating convergent validity between field experiments, 
economic laboratory exercises, and contingent valuation responses and identifying 
further dimension of response heterogeneity to social- norm nudges, our research 
contributes to the broader literature on norm-based conservation incentives.  First, in 
contrast to energy and water conservation in which the psychological cues and 
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economics savings are mutually reinforcing, our contingent valuation study of 
willingness to pay for “green electricity” and laboratory experiment study of 
willingness to contribute to a public good involve tradeoffs between private costs and 
societal or group gains.  As such, our work extends the work of Shang and Crosson, 
(2009) and Chen (2009) who show that some individuals are willing to bear additional 
monetary burdens in response to information about social norms. Second, much of the 
previous research on norm-based messaging has been confined to providing 
information about peer consumption in the domain of the desired conservation 
activity.  For example, studies that seek to encourage towel re-use in hotels, provide 
information about towel re-use habits of others (Goldstein et al. 2008).  At the same 
time some limited research suggests that social-norm information in one domain of 
decision-making affects decisions in other domains (Mazar and Zhong, 2010; Keizer 
et al., 2008).  These studies have considered moral licensing—learning you are more 
more moral in one domain makes you less moral in another—and moral cleansing—
learning you are less moral in one domain makes you more moral in another. Our 
research speaks to both and finds an asymmetric response. This asymmetry could 
produce a “moral rebound” effect that limits the effectiveness of social-norm based 
policy interventions. Therefore, understanding such response patterns could 
significantly improve the design of interventions and explain the limited effectiveness 
of past trials. More mundanely, our design speaks directly to the effect of carbon 
footprint calculators on the demand for carbon offsets and green electricity. 
Our main findings are that information about the behaviors of others influences 
public provision behavior in contingent valuation and lab experiments. The effect of 
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social information is asymmetrical— the moral cleansing effect for individuals above 
the norm is larger than the moral licensing effect for those whose consumption and 
negative externality effects are below the perceived norm.  Finally, we demonstrate 
that systematic heterogeneity in responses to social norm nudges extends substantially 
beyond the political/environmental dimensions explored in Costa and Kahn’s field 
experiment.  As we argue in the concluding section, these findings, in conjunction 
with emerging field research, raise questions about the universal efficacy of nudges 
vis-à-vis pricing incentives. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  In the following section 
we review previous economic and psychological conceptualizations of the notion of 
culpability or guilt in choice and valuation and how these concepts have been tested in 
laboratory and contingent valuation exercises.  We then provide details on our 
experimental design and data.  In the fourth section we provide empirical analyses of 
our experimental results with respect to asymmetry in response patterns above versus 
below norm respondents. The fifth section lends supporting evidence to the Costa and 
Kahn results, and expands the analysis of heterogeneity to demographic and 
respondent-specific characteristics available from survey data.  Conclusions and 
discussion are provided in the final section. 
 
II. Background on Culpability 
In this research we explore how willingness to pay to prevent a public bad is 
affected by an individual’s relative culpability, which we define to be the amount of 
social damage resulting from an individual’s actions relative to damages cause by 
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others.15  Whereas the mechanisms that might induce conformity to a perceived social 
norm have been extensively studied in economics (see for example Bikhchandani, 
Hirshleifer, and Welch, 1992; Ellison and Fudenberg, 1993;  Bernheim, 1994; Akerlof 
and Kranton, 2000; Glaeser and Scheinkman, 2003), the mechanism of culpability has 
received less attention.  Guilt has been explored in the psychology literature (see 
Baumeister, Stillwell, and Heatherton, 1994 for a review).  Perhaps most famously, 
Carlsmith and Gross (1969) induced guilt in subjects by having them administer 
electric shocks to another person, a confederate. Later, when subjects believe they 
have completed the experiment, they are asked to donate blood. Subjects who actually 
administered the shock are much more likely to agree to donate, relative to subjects 
who merely observed the shocking. 
Building from psychological foundations and psychological game theory (see 
Geanakoplos, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1989),  Charness, Dufwenberg and co-authors 
construct a general theory of guilt aversion in which decision-makers experience guilt 
if they believe they let others down (e.g. Dufwenberg and Lundhom, 2001; Charness 
and Dufwenberg, 2006, 2007; Battigali and Dufwenberg (2007)).  With supportive 
results from “Trust Game” experiments, they propose that this general theoretical 
framework can be extended to specific instances, such as public goods games and 
social norms, where it seems plausible that decision-makers are affected by guilt.  In 
doing so these authors take care to distinguish the role of guilt aversion from 
conformity:  “A norm is a social moral expectation a definition of which acts people in 
                                                
15 Our focus is on relative culpability because pilot experiments found that information about one’s 
absolute level of social damage without comparison to one’s peers had no effect on behavior. 
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society will judge as right or wrong...Too many authors use  “norm” just to mean 
``conformity in behavior''. (Dufwenberg and Lundhom, 2001, p. 510). 
Andreoni’s (1995) prior research on public goods suggests that such 
motivations may depend on whether the provision of the public good is framed 
positively or negatively.  In Andreoni (1995), two groups of subjects participated in 
strategically identical public goods provision games, but with two separate framings. 
In one, the experiment was framed as providing a public good so that subjects would 
be motivated by warm glow altruism; in the other, the experiment was framed as 
avoiding a public bad, so that subjects would be motivated by a desire to avoid a “cold 
prickle” of guilt.   Sonnemanns et al. (1998) conduct a like set of experiments in a 
threshold provision setting, alternatively framing the experiments as provision to 
provide a public good and prevention of a public bad.  In both the Andreoni and 
Sonnemanns et al. studies, the tendency to free ride was more prevalent in the negative 
framing. Similarly, Solnick and Hemenway (2005) present informal survey evidence 
where positional concerns matter more for public goods rather than for public bads. 
In the specific area of environmental norms, Bamberg and Moser (2006) 
conduct a meta-analysis of the literature on psychological mechanisms that promote 
pro-environmental behavior, finding that both social norms and guilt are important 
correlates to pro-environmental attitudes and behavior. Clark, Kotchen and Moore 
(2003) find that participation in a green electricity program is correlated with self-
reported altruism and pro-environmental attitudes as measured by the New 
Environmental Paradigm (NEP). Brouwer et al. (2008) test the “passenger  pays 
principle” to find that air travelers’ perceived responsibility for climate change, 
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awareness of the environmental impact of flying, and the frequency of flying were all 
positively correlated with WTP for a per-flight carbon offset program. This notion of 
personal responsibility in creating public harm is an extension of what Kahneman 
(1993) refers to as an “outrage effect”, in which people are willing to pay more to 
avoid an environmental problem if they think it is human-caused than if they think that 
it is an outcome of nature (Bulte et al., 2005).  Kahneman (1993) and Brown et al. 
(2002), amongst others have demonstrated this “outrage effect” on contingent 
valuation responses. 
 Our experiments complement the aforementioned literature by honing in on the 
individual culpability in contingent valuation and public goods experimental settings. 
We use peer information to manipulate the norm in a sequential setting most similar to 
the framing experiments of Andreoni (1995) and Sonnemans et al. (1998).  Rather 
than split “Provision of Public Good” and “Prevention of Public Bad” samples as done 
in these studies, however, we employ a sequential framework: in the first stage of the 
experiment, we observe private decisions in a negative externality setting; the second 
stage involves a public goods contributions game in which contributions mitigate the 
negative effects of decisions in the first stage.   We expect two main outcomes. For 
those who learn they contribute more to the negative externality than the perceived 
norm, i.e. have positive relative culpability, we expect they will be more altruistic in 
the second. For those who experience negative culpability, by learning they contribute 
less to the negative externality than the perceived norm in the first stage, we expect 
they will be less altruistic in the second. We find support for both of these effects, but 
we find that the former dominates. All treatment groups behaved less altruistically 
 103 
than those who received no information at all. This “moral licensing” effect has been 
explored by Mazur and Zhong (2010) who find that those who are given the 
opportunity to purchase green goods are more likely to cheat on an exam. Similarly, in 
one field experimental test of the “broken windows” effect, Keizer et al. (2008) find 
that observing others violate one social norm makes subjects more likely to violate 
other social norms.  Our results further demonstrate that the effect predominates in 
those pre-disposed to provide more public goods in the second domain—for example 
Democrats, replicating in a lab and contingent valuation context the findings of Costa 
and Kahn (2010) who observed that the affect is limited to Democrats in a field 
experiment on electricity conservation. We extend their work to show that the 
heterogeneous effect exists along other dimensions as well. 
 
III. Experimental Design 
 Contingent Valuation Experiment:  
 The broad objective of the contingent valuation survey was to gather 
information from participants that allowed us to calculate a carbon footprint for each 
respondent and then elicit their willingness to pay for a green electricity program 
given information about their own carbon footprint and, in some treatments, their 
carbon footprint relative to those of another survey participant.  Participants for the 
online hypothetical survey were recruited through The StudyResponse Project, a 
nationwide panel of 95,574 people.  The diversity of the sample, as seen in the 
summary statistics in Table 1 will be important for our analysis. Participants were 
chosen at random and emailed the URL for the survey.  For completing the survey, 
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participants received $5.  520 panelists were invited to participate, and we received 
420 completed surveys for an 81% response rate. 
There were four steps in the survey: I) Eliciting demographic questions to 
calculate the subject’s carbon footprint; II) Providing information about International 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) predictions on the impacts of climate change; III) 
Showing subjects their estimated annual carbon footprint based on the input they 
provided; and IV) Eliciting individual demand for green electricity.  For the control 
treatment, subjects were not provided any information about the carbon footprint of 
others.  All other subjects received information about the carbon footprint of “Others 
like you who took this survey”. (See Figure 3.1) 
 
FIGURE 3.1: Information about Carbon Footprint presented in the survey.  The 
“low treatment” (11 tons) is shown. 
Part I of the survey consisted of several web pages eliciting information about 
energy use, including housing characteristics (type, age, size of residence, and 
location), home energy use (monthly electric and gas bill expenditures, type of fuel 
used to heat house, whether the household generates or purchases electricity); 
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automobiles (number, models, use of each vehicle) and transportation choices (use of 
public transportation, frequency of short and long domestic flights, frequency of 
international flights).  Subjects were also asked about whether they purchased carbon 
offsets and if so, how many had they purchased.  Only 31 subjects reported having 
purchased carbon offsets. 
Subsequent to providing the above information, subjects were provided with 
three IPCC climate policy scenarios and their anticipated consequences as presented 
below in Figure 3.2.   The purpose of this screen was two-fold.  First, we wanted to 
make respondents aware of current climate projections and relative policy options 
ranging from “Business as Usual” to “Aggressive Emissions Reductions.”   To a 
certain extent, this information also served to induce an element of moral outrage for 
those concerned about climate change. 
In Part III, respondents were provided with an estimate of the carbon generated 
from their use of utilities and transportation and, after accounting for offset purchases, 
their estimated carbon footprint (“the total amount of climate changing greenhouse gas 
emissions caused directly and indirectly by your household”) in tons of carbon per 
year.  Carbon footprints were calculated using two algorithms.  If participants knew 
their electricity and heating expenditures, information about average electricity and 
fuel prices in each state were used to determine annual consumption of electricity and 
fuel.  (If participants knew their fuel expenditures but not their fuel source for heating, 
a weighted average of all fuel sources for the state was used.)  Annual consumption of 
electricity was then converted into CO2 emissions using the average CO2 intensity for 
each state.  Fuel consumption was converted into CO2 emissions using information 
 106 
about CO2 intensity for each fuel type. If participants did not know their electricity 
and heating expenditures, we gathered information about their housing structure and 
compared it to information about average energy consumption for houses of similar 
age, type and size in their state, which was then used to calculate CO2 emissions as 
above.  Information about fuel prices, generation mix and average household energy 
consumption was obtained from the Energy Information Administration. 
 
Climate Options 
 
 
The IPCC has presented several options for reducing climate change, each with 
different final levels of carbon and impacts on the global climate: 
  Business as Usual Small Emissions Reductions Aggressive Emissions Reductions 
Mean Percent 
change in Carbon 
Emissions from 2000 
to 2050 
115% Increase 55% Increase 70% Decrease 
Global Average 
Temperatures 
Increases 
8.8-11 degrees (4.9-6.1 degrees 
Celsius) 
7.2-8.8 degrees Fahrenheit (4-4.9 
degrees Celsius) 
3.6-4.3 degrees Fahrenheit 
(2-2.4 degrees Celsius) 
Sea Level Increases 12-24 inches (0.3 - 0.6 meters) Millions at risk of coastal flooding 
10-24 inches (0.26 - 0.6 meters) 
Millions at risk of coastal flooding. 
Less than 17 inches (0.45 
meters) 
Extinction Risk More than 40% of species face some risk 
More than 40% of species face some 
risk 
30% of species face some 
risk 
Crops and Famine 
Crop productivity is expected to 
decrease. Global food production is 
expected to decrease, causing an 
increased risk of famine. 
Crop productivity is expected to 
decrease. Global food production is 
expected to decrease, causing an 
increased risk of famine. 
Crop productivity may 
increase in some regions 
and decrease in others. 
Increased risk of famine in 
some areas. 
Other effects 
Increase in intensity and frequency of 
heat waves. Increased range for 
tropical diseases. Together, these will 
cause death and sickness, placing a 
substantial burden on health services. 
Increase in intensity and frequency of 
heat waves. Increased range for 
tropical diseases. Together, these will 
cause death and sickness, placing a 
substantial burden on health services. 
Increase in intensity and 
frequency of heat waves. 
FIGURE 3.2:  Information about Climate Change Presented in On-Line Survey 
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Information about participants’ cars and miles driven was directly computed 
based on combined city/highway fuel economy information from the EPA for every 
make, model and year of car from 1983 to 2009.  For air travel, short flights were 
assumed to be 100 miles each way, long flights 750 miles, and international flights 
4,250 miles.  Carbon offsets reduced the carbon footprint by 168 pounds for every 
dollar spent, equivalent to prevailing rates at popular commercial carbon offset 
retailers. 
Median estimated carbon emissions for the sample were 17.9 tons per 
household per year.  For subjects in the control group, no other information was 
provided.16  Individuals in the treatment groups were informed that  “Others like you 
who took this survey in the past had a carbon footprint of xx tons per year” and 
whether their contribution was MORE or LESS than this  value.  The “xx” value was 
randomly assigned to be high (26 tons) or low (11 tons).  For example, a subject with 
an estimated carbon footprint of 18 tons and was assigned to the “See Low” group 
would be told that “Others like you who took this survey in the past had a carbon 
footprint of 11 tons per year” and that “Your contribution to global warming is MORE 
than this average.”  Similarly, a like individual who was assigned to the “See High” 
treatment was “Others like you who took this survey in the past had a carbon footprint 
of 26 tons per year” and that “Your contribution to global warming is LESS than this 
average.”  26 tons and 11 tons were selected because they were the average footprint 
from various pilot samples, that happened to be near the 25th and 75th percentile of the 
                                                
16 In pilot experiments, we also compared the results of a control group where no information about 
carbon footprint was given to the current control group where the carbon footprint was given without 
peer comparison and found no significant difference in behavior. 
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total sample. This ensures that on average about half of all of those treated were 
informed that they were relatively more culpable than others, while half received 
information that they were relatively less culpable. As will be discussed below, the 
difference between the subject’s carbon footprint and the value associated with the 
reference individual provided a measure of relative culpability. 
Given this information contingent values (CV) were elicited using a 
modification of a green electricity payment card used in Champ and Bishop (2001, 
2006) in which individuals were given opportunities to buy blocks of energy measured 
in kilowatt hours.  As shown in Figure 3.3 each block had a corresponding monthly 
and annual cost and estimated annual tons of CO2 averted based on information 
available from the Energy Information Administration. 
FIGURE 3.3: Elicitation Question for Contingent Valuation in On-Line Survey 
In Part IV, debriefing and demographic questions were asked, along with ten 
questions designed to measure environmental concern drawn from the New 
Environmental Paradigm (NEP) scale (Dunlap and Van Liere, 1978; Dunlap et al. 
2000.)  This scale is widely used in the psychology and sociology literature to 
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characterize an individual’s environmental concern based on  the extent to which they 
agree or disagree with various statements of environmental concern: 
“limits to growth, anthropocentrism, the fragility of the balance of nature, 
rejection of the idea that humans are exempt from the constraints of nature, and 
the possibility of an eco-crisis or ecological catastrophe. The response 
categories range between 1 and 5 so that high scores correspond to a stronger 
pro-environmental attitude than low scores (with the ordering reversed for the 
statements that reject the NEP-paradigm)” (Ek and Söderholm, 2008, p. 175) 
 
Past studies of willingness to pay for green electricity have found the aggregated 
values across a series of NEP questions to be a significant, exogenous explanatory 
variable (Kotchen and Moore, 2007; Ek and Söderholm, 2008). We also asked 
subjects their political party identification, and political orientation on a Likert scale 
that ranged from “Very Liberal” to “Very Conservative”.  
Twelve observations in our data set were identified as outliers and excluded 
from analysis: ten of these observations were excluded because at least one component 
of their carbon footprint was much greater than the rest of the sample, often an order 
of magnitude more.  These observations were unrealistically high values, appearing to 
be incorrectly entered responses as to miles driven, airline flights, carbon offsets 
purchased, or housing information.  The other two observations are repeated surveys.  
Removing these twelve observations halves the mean of the reported carbon footprint 
and reduces the standard deviation by an order of magnitude. 
Lab Experiment: 
We endeavored to develop a parallel experimental economics laboratory in 
which subjects purchase “private commodities” (analogous to electricity) that generate 
a negative public externality (analogous to pollution) for a group in which they are a 
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member.  The subjects are subsequently given an opportunity to contribute to a fund 
that would reduce the negative harm created by the externality, akin, we believe to the 
opportunity to purchase green electricity. 
Subjects (n=240) were recruited from a variety of undergraduate business and 
economics courses at Cornell University. Pen and paper experimental sessions were 
conducted in the Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Decision Research in 
cohorts ranging in size from 10 to 20. A session lasted approximately 45 minutes and 
average earnings were $14.41. 
Subjects were randomly assigned into groups of five anonymous participants 
including themselves.  Adapting Plott’s (1983) seminal externality experiments, each 
individual was given a balance of $9 at the beginning of each of five rounds and a per-
unit value (demand) function for a commodity that could be purchased at a cost of $1 
(experimental dollars were converted to real dollars at a rate of $15 experimental  = $1 
real.) Subjects in each group were randomly assigned into high, low and medium 
demands and the choices offered to individuals were presented (see Appendix for full 
experimental instructions). 
In addition to private return for each commodity unit purchased, subjects were 
informed that each unit purchased would impose a negative externality on the entire 
group,  
Your group also shares a GROUP FUND.  This group fund began with 300 
experimental dollars, and at the end of the experiment, any dollars in this 
group fund will be divided equally between all members of the group.  Your 
actions and the actions of other people in your group in Round 1 may have 
reduced the total amount of dollars remaining in the group fund. 
 
 111 
In Round [1-5], every unit of the commodity that you purchase decreases the 
number of experimental dollars in the group fund by 1.25.  (Because there are 
five people in your group, every unit of the commodity that you purchase 
reduces the amount in the group fund by 0.25 dollars per person.  Likewise, 
every unit of the commodity purchased by everyone else in the group reduces 
the amount in the group fund by 1.25 dollars and therefore costs everyone else 
0.25 dollars.) 
 
Hence, the optimal private decision would be to purchase only those commodities with 
a value of $1.25 or higher. Examples were worked through with the entire session on a 
whiteboard at the front of the lab, and after each decision, subjects were asked to 
calculate and report their own private returns and the impacts of their private decisions 
on other members of the group. Subjects were asked to sum their commodity 
purchases over the first five rounds and write this number down on a “passing sheet” 
which was submitted to the experimental moderator.   The experimental moderator 
passed these sheets back to other subjects, who were then asked to record their own 
total purchases and the amount of total purchases that they saw on the sheet that was 
passed to them. Those in the high culpability treatment received the sheet of someone 
else with low demand, those in the medium culpability treatment received the sheet of 
someone with medium demand, those in the low culpability treatment received the 
sheet of someone with high demand, and those in the control received their own sheet 
back again. As in the CV experiment, we dropped 14 out of 240 outliers from analysis 
on the assumption that they were not paying attention carefully to the rules of the 
game. These were the subjects that chose to consume more than what was even 
privately optimal (i.e. they consumed at levels where the private cost exceeded the 
private benefit).  
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IV. Analysis and Results 
Contingent Valuation Experiment 
Our analyses of the contingent valuation and laboratory experiments breaks the 
sample into treatment and control groups.  In the contingent valuation “Treatment” 
group, subjects were informed about the carbon footprints of “Others like [them] who 
took this survey in the past”, with others like them corresponding to the “See Low” 
(n=111) and “See High” (n=84) information described previously.  Similarly, the 
“Treatment” group in the Lab Experiment is organized by whether subjects were 
passed information from a subject with a “High” (n=63), “Medium” (n=29) or “Low” 
(n=62) induced demand.  No such relative information was provided to the “Control” 
groups in the contingent valuation (n= 79) and lab (n =64) experiments.   
Averages for the control and treatment groups are provided in Table 3.1 for the 
contingent valuation experiments.  In the contingent valuation experiment, the 
dependent values reported are annual willingness to pay for green electricity.  As these 
data are not conditioned on other possible covariates, some caution should be taken in 
interpreting the treatment effects.  However, it is particularly notable that in both 
cases, providing information appears to either not affect average contributions or has a 
negative effect relative to the control group. The high culpability (11 ton) inducement 
yielded the same average willingness to pay ($143.40) as the control ($143.33). The 
low culpability inducement led people to contribute less ($107.68). This would 
suggest that providing social norms tends to lower willingness to pay values. The 
average willingness to pay of the full treatment group was ($128.20). If these results 
generalize, then contingent valuation studies that fail to provide information about 
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peers would provide higher values than studies that provide such information, 
regardless of whether the individual is higher or lower than the norm.  Such a result 
corresponds to the “broken windows” effect that observing others violate one social 
norm makes subjects more likely to violate other social norms. (Keizer et al. (2008) 
TABLE 3.1: Summary Statistics for Contingent Valuation Experiment 
 By Treatment Group  Treated: By Culpability 
 Control Saw 11 
Tons 
Saw 26 
Tons 
 Saw Low 
Footprint 
Saw High 
Footprint 
WTP 
(Average 
of lower 
bound of 
interval) 143.33 143.40 107.68 
 
152.26 96.40 
 (15.41) (12.30) (12.98)  (12.87) (11.46) 
CO2 Total 23.30 20.84 25.91  32.01 11.08 
 (2.35) (1.85) (2.64)  (2.34) (0.67) 
Relative 
Culpability 
 
9.84 -0.09 
 
16.96 -9.38 
  (1.85) (2.64)  (2.18) (0.72) 
NEP 34.01 35.25 34.65  34.37 35.82 
 (0.81) (0.67) (0.82)  (0.71) (0.75) 
Politics 0.75 0.75 0.66  0.73 0.69 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)  (0.04) (0.05) 
Children 0.58 0.50 0.53  0.63 0.36 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)  (0.05) (0.05) 
Gender 0.57 0.49 0.49  0.47 0.52 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)  (0.05) (0.05) 
Age 37.61 37.50 40.39  36.86 41.20 
 (1.17) (1.19) (1.40)  (1.10) (1.50) 
Income 5.04 4.65 4.30  4.94 3.93 
 (0.23) (0.17) (0.21)  (0.17) (0.20) 
Education 0.53 0.53 0.46  0.55 0.43 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)  (0.05) (0.05) 
Democrat 0.41 0.46 0.34  0.41 0.40 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.05) (0.05) 
N= 79 112 83  111 84 
Summary statistics for Not outliers, with no missing observations 
Standard Errors in parentheses 
CO2 Total: Total CO2 Footprint 
Culpability: Total CO2 Footprint – (11 or 26 tons, depending on treatment) 
NEP: Aggregate NEP value 
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Politics: Binary for liberal/conservative (1 if liberal) 
Children: Binary for children in household 
Gender: Binary for gender (1 if female) 
Age: Age of respondent 
Income: Household income in levels (0: <$10K, 1: $10K-$15K, 2: $15K-$25K, 3: $25K-
$35K, 4: $35K-$50K, 5: $50K-$75K, 6: $75K-$100K, 7: $100K-$150K, 8: $150K-$200K, 9: 
>$200K 
Education: Binary for education (1 if at least college education) 
Democrat: Binary for party affiliation (1 if democrat) 
 
Columns (4) and (5) show the summary statistics divided by those who saw 
peer information lower  (“saw low”) or higher (“saw high”) than themselves. While 
the willingness to pay in these columns cannot be cleanly interpreted because 
membership in saw high or saw low is endogenous and depends on own carbon 
footprint, dividing the dataset in this way will be useful when we turn to regression 
analysis to understand the asymmetry in behavior. However, we address the 
endogeneity directly in the lab experiment. 
 Econometric modeling reveals more about the structure of how subjects 
responded to the peer information. In modeling the responses to the contingent 
valuation experiment, the dependent variable we use is “extra cost per year.”  Given 
the discrete, ordered nature of the payment card response options, we extend 
Cameron’s expenditure difference model (1988) to the interval modeling format 
developed in Cameron and Huppert (1989), wherein circling a particular threshold 
value provides the lower bound of a willingness to pay (WTP) interval bounded from 
above by the next cost point.  Assuming a logistically distributed WTP function, and 
letting E(WTP) = $Z and var(WTP) = #2 yields  the following log likelihood function: 
!" ! ! !" ! !!!! ! !!"! ! ! ! !!!! ! !!"! !!!!! , 
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where F(.)  indicates the logistic distribution, Z is a vector of covariates, tiU is the 
upper bound of the interval selected, tiL is the lower bound, and the scale parameter " 
=  # ! !.17  Throughout, robust standard errors are reported, based on the Huber-
White heteroskedasticity-consistent-covariance-matrix estimator. 
For the treatment group, we constructed a relative culpability variable 
measuring the difference between the subject’s carbon and the “other” carbon 
footprint he/she was shown.  
Culpability = Own footprint – Observed footprint of others 
In specifications where we include the control group which had no information 
about their peers, we set culpability to zero on the assumption that people assume their 
footprint is about the same as others. However, since it is reasonable to assume that 
the effect of culpability differs depending on whether peer information was made 
available, we focus on the regression specifications that drop subjects in the control 
condition. In the regressions reported in Table 3.2, we also included controls for the 
subject’s own carbon footprint (CO2 Footprint), the NEP scale response summed over 
the 10 Likert scale NEP questions (NEP)18, and a self-reported political scale (Political 
Scale) variable extending from 0 (very liberal) to 6 (very conservative), which has 
been recoded into a binary variable for liberal political leaning at the median of the 
sample.  These latter two variables comport with the environmental and political 
orientation variables in the Costa and Kahn study (2010).  In addition, standard 
                                                
17 These regressions were also all done with OLS and Tobit (because of non-negativity constraints), as 
well as Huber-White (heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator) standard errors and 
(for the lab experiment) corrections for cluster-level standard errors.  All these alternate models 
produced essentially the same results. 
18 The Cronbach alpha value for the subjects for the NEP questions was 0.7785, generally consistent 
with the literature, and indicating that the NEP is a coherent metric.   
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demographic and socio-economic variables of the type typically included in 
contingent valuation research (age, gender, children in household, income and 
education) are added as covariates. 
TABLE 3.2: MLE Results for Contingent Valuation Experiment 
 Control  Treated 
 Continuous Culpability Conditional 
Culpability 
 Full Model Short 
Model 
Full Model Short 
Model 
Constant -127.41  -35.04 -36.32 -32.97 -32.25 
 (113.61)  (56.77) (48.63) (56.82) (49.15) 
Relative 
Culpability>0 
    
3.60** 3.36** 
     (1.52) (1.52) 
Relative 
Culpability<0 
    
2.64* 2.34 
     (1.50) (1.50) 
Relative 
Culpability 
  
3.11*** 2.84** 
  
   (1.17) (1.17)   
CO2 
Footprint 0.58 
 
-0.89 -0.63 -1.25 -0.99 
 (0.88)  (1.22) (1.23) (1.41) (1.40) 
NEP 7.41***  4.63*** 5.16*** 4.57*** 5.08*** 
 (2.49)  (1.28) (1.20) (1.28) (1.21) 
Politics 5.98  9.93  9.84  
 (38.02)  (20.01)  (19.97)  
Children 9.25  26.07  27.50  
 (35.85)  (18.74)  (18.95)  
Gender -23.46  -22.73  -22.20  
 (36.05)  (17.76)  (17.77)  
Age 0.42  1.12  1.12  
 (1.75)  (0.72)  (0.72)  
Income -2.82  -8.51  -8.24  
 (8.56)  (5.56)  (5.58)  
Education 48.17  15.06  14.74  
 (35.55)  (18.48)  (18.47)  
Theta 80.46***  67.94*** 69.38*** 67.83*** 69.26*** 
 (8.30)  (4.31) (4.39) (4.31) (4.39) 
Observations 79  195 195 195 195 
Log 
Likelihood -176.44 
 
-424.85 -428.41 -424.72 -428.27 
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Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
All samples exclude outliers and observations with any missing samples 
 
Table 3.2 reports estimation results for Full Models with all the 
aforementioned covariates and Short Models with only a subset of the variables.  The 
vector of covariates was organized into three sub-vectors: 1) Estimation Variables 
(Constant, Theta); 2) Culpability Measures (Relative Culpability > (<) 0; Relative 
Culpability, CO2 Total); and 3) Demographic Variables (NEP, Politics, Children, Age, 
Income, Education). For both the latter two groups the estimation strategy followed 
the pretest estimation procedure presented in Goldberger (1991) wherein Likelihood 
Ratio Tests were used to test the zero-null-vector hypothesis for the entire group 
(which was rejected in all cases).  This was followed by a stepwise procedure in which 
the most insignificant coefficients were sequentially dropped. Coefficients were 
retained in the short model if their corresponding p values were less than the cutoff 
value of 0.15.  Further, CO2 Total was kept as a control variable in all estimations. 
The econometric analysis reveals that though on average, those who received 
peer information were willing to contribute less than those who did not, people are 
indeed positively and significantly influenced by relative culpability—those who were 
induced to feel relatively more culpable were willing to pay more than those who were 
induced to feel relatively less culpable. Specifically, for each ton of CO2 a person is 
led to believe that  she polluted more than others, her willingness to pay increases by 
$2.84 to $3.11. For context, the mean culpability score for someone who saw a lower 
footprint was 16.96 tons, and the mean WTP for the control group was $143.33.  In 
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addition to the estimation variables, culpability, and CO2 Total, Only the NEP 
covariate was retained in the Short Model.  
To better reconcile the regression results with the aggregate effects, we interact 
binary variables for those with positive culpability scores (those who are induced to 
feel more culpable than others) and those with negative culpability scores (those who 
are induced to feel less culpable than others) with the relative culpability measure.  
This is referred to as “Conditional Culpability” in Table 2.  Columns (4) and (5) 
present the results and find evidence that the impact of peer information is 
asymmetric.  Those who are more culpable than those they observed significantly 
increase their WTP by $3.36-$3.60 for each ton of additional culpability.  There is no 
significant effect of relative culpability for those who are less culpable than those they 
observed (p=0.326 in a z-test).  Note that since we control for each individual’s own 
CO2 footprint, the coefficient on culpability is identified off the exogenously assigned 
treatment group. There remains the concern that in this asymmetry, we are merely 
capturing the difference between those with high footprint and low footprint in a way 
that is not controlled for by the inclusion of the footprint variable (perhaps due to a 
non-linear relationship). To address this concern, we rely on the results from the lab 
experiment where footprint is exogenously assigned. 
Lab Experiment 
In order to better isolate the effect of culpability we rely on the results of a 
context-free lab experiment in which an individual’s impacts on the public good is an 
outcome of an induced demand for the private good.  Since culpability depends only 
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on own consumption levels and the observed consumption levels of others, the lab 
experiment allows a degree of exogenous control over both components.  
Table 3.3 presents the summary statistics for the lab experiment. Note once 
again, that even though positive culpability was induced for two of the three treatment 
conditions, as before, all conditions yielded less (or at most equal) altruistic behavior 
than the control (3.41 tokens). On average, it appears that information on culpability 
leads to less altruistic behavior in both CV and experimental laboratory settings. 
TABLE 3.3: Summary Statistics for Laboratory Experiment 
 Control  Entire Sample  Treated 
  By Induced Demand  By Culpability 
  Small Medium Large  Saw 
Smaller 
Saw 
Larger 
Saw 
Same 
Round 6 
Purchases 3.31 
 
2.38 2.79 3.42 
 
2.81 2.78 
 
0.83^ 
 (0.45)  (0.37) (0.56) (0.38)  (0.40) (0.43) (0.48) 
Relative 
Culpability n.a. 
 
-5.78 3.55 11.23 
 
-3.60 16.59 
 
0.83 
   (1.04) (1.28) (1.16)  (1.65) (1.09) (3.31) 
Total 
Purchases 18.27 
 
12.86 18.97 23.51 
 
13.10 25.49 
 
22.67 
 (1.13)  (0.36) (0.98) (1.11)  (0.56) (1.01) (3.95) 
NEP 24.23  22.70 25.67 24.26  22.63 24.94 25.33 
 (0.72)  (0.60) (1.10) (0.64)  (0.60) (0.89) (2.43) 
Liberal 0.58  0.68 0.48 0.54  0.63 0.53 0.67 
 (0.06)  (0.06) (0.09) (0.06)  (0.06) (0.07) (0.21) 
Democrat 0.45  0.54 0.42 0.44  0.55 0.41 0.50 
 (0.06)  (0.06) (0.09) (0.06)  (0.06) (0.07) (0.21) 
Observations 64  69 33 81  62 51 6 
All samples are excluding “greater than ideal”: people whose purchases exceeded the 
private optimum and likely misunderstood the experiment.  All samples also exclude 
any observations with any missing responses. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
^: Value is less than control at p<0.05 
Since each unit of a subject’s consumption choice generates negative 
externalities on others in the experimental session, we use their consumption choice as 
the analogue for “carbon footprint.”  Also, in order to ensure the exogeneity of the 
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culpability variable, we use the expected target footprint he would have been induced 
to select if he were a completely self-interested rationally maximized individual given 
the treatment condition he was in (high demand, medium demand, low demand) 
instead of using the subject’s actual own “footprint” minus  footprint of others,. This 
measure is highly correlated with actual culpability (% = 0.7799), but ensures that the 
culpability score is exogenous and not correlated with subject characteristics like 
altruism, as is possibly the case in the CV experiment.  
Lab Culpability = Induced target footprint – Observed footprint of others 
Table 3.4 presents the maximum likelihood estimates using the same 
econometric model and estimation strategy as the one used for the CV experiment, 
with similar asymmetric patterns emerging. Relative culpability is not significant in 
the full sample, and indeed the only significant coefficient is that of the politics 
covariate.  When the  estimation separates those who were either above or below the  
norms shown, those with relatively high induced relative culpability provide 
significantly more to the public good in the short, but not the full model.  There is an 
insignificant effect for those with less relative culpability. Note that we used a 
maximum likelihood model here to be consistent with the CV specification, but we 
also tested OLS, Tobit, and an IV specification where we used the exogenously 
assigned treatment group as an instrument for culpability in a reviewer’s appendix. We 
also repeated those specifications, clustering by experimental group. These alternate 
specifications yielded largely similar results. 
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TABLE 3.4: MLE Results for Laboratory Experiment 
 Control  Treated 
   Continuous Culpability  Conditional Culpability 
   Full Model Short 
Model 
 Full Model Short 
Model 
Constant 0.51  2.88* 1.71  2.42 2.00* 
 (3.17)  (1.61) (1.23)  (1.63) (1.16) 
Relative 
Culpability>0 
     
0.06* 0.07* 
      (0.04) (0.04) 
Relative 
Culpability<0 
     
-0.03 -0.05 
      (0.05) (0.05) 
Relative 
Culpability  
 
0.02 0.02 
   
   (0.02) (0.02)    
Total 
Purchases -0.01 
 
-0.01 -0.02 
 
-0.01 -0.03 
 (0.05)  (0.04) (0.04)  (0.04) (0.04) 
NEP 0.14  -0.05   -0.04  
 (0.10)  (0.05)   (0.05)  
Politics 0.71  0.87 0.93*  0.74  
 (1.03)  (0.56) (0.56)  (0.56)  
Experimental 
Dummies? Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Theta 1.94***  1.55*** 1.56***  1.54*** 1.56*** 
 (0.20)  (0.12) (0.12)  (0.12) (0.12) 
Observations 64  119 119  119 119 
Log 
Likelihood -168.79 
 
-290.11 -290.74 
 
-289.27 -290.70 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
All samples are excluding “greater than ideal”: people whose purchases exceeded the 
private optimum and likely misunderstood the experiment.  All samples also exclude 
any observations with any missing responses. 
Note while the culpability variable is insignificant for the full sample, we again 
see the asymmetric effect when one sees higher others compared to seeing lower 
others in the short model. 
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V. Heterogeneity in Responsiveness to Norms 
Costa and Kahn (2010) noted the heterogeneous effect of the peer information 
experiment on Democrats vs Republicans. We confirm their findings by dividing the 
data into self-identified “Democrats” (a relatively liberal party in the United States) 
and all others (Non-DEM).  We extend their work by also considering heterogeneity in 
other dimensions, including liberal versus conservative, number of children, gender, 
age, income, education, and NEP score, available for the relatively diverse contingent 
valuation study.  For each of these socio-economic dimensions, we partitioned our 
sample along the median, and ran the same estimation models as above for each 
partition. Summary statistics and correlation tables are found in the reviewer’s 
appendix—note that although these demographic characteristics are correlated, the 
correlations are quite low. 
We first note that our results are consistent with Costa and Kahn (2010). As 
shown in column (1) of Table 3.5, the coefficient on culpability for Democrats was 
positive and significant, indicating that such individuals are responsive to social norm 
nudges.    Indeed, in the regression this parameter dominates in the sense that the 
coefficients for the other explanatory variables are not significant.  As shown in 
Column (3), however, neither the coefficient for Culpability nor for the CO2 Footprint 
are significant: non-democrats are not affected by our culpability inducement.  Yet, 
coefficients for NEP and Political Scale are significant and consistent with 
expectations in the Non-Dem regressions. 
It is evident that this heterogeneity in response patterns extends to other 
dimensions. We find that culpability is effective for liberals but not non-liberals; for 
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those with children but not for those without children; for men but not for women; for 
those older than 36.5 but not those younger; for those above approximately $50,000 
for income but not for those below; for those with a college degree but not for those 
without; for those who are more environmental conscious (NEP score > 34.5)..  
A possible explanation for the patterns in Tables 3.5 – 3.7 is that peer 
information nudges work on those already inclined to give, but do not work and may 
even backfire when preaching to those less inclined. It is also possible that in the 
specific context of climate change, those who question the premise of whether climate 
change is happening may be unresponsive. Also, the fact that the effect of culpability 
on those with high versus low carbon footprints allows us to rule out the hypothesis 
that the heterogeneity in other dimensions like income or age, only because those 
dimensions are correlated with carbon footprint. 
We should be careful to note that this heterogeneity analysis should be seen as 
exploratory and mostly provided to be suggestive for future work. However, the fact 
that such heterogeneity exists appears quite robust. Awareness of this heterogeneity is 
important for increasing the precision of estimates of the effect of peer information 
interventions, as well as for increasing the cost effectiveness of future norm based 
interventions. 
VI. Conclusions  
Using a contingent valuation framed field experiment coupled with a 
conventional lab experiment to examine how peer information that induces culpability 
differs from peer information interventions based on conformity. We demonstrate that 
there is important heterogeneity in how altruism responds to such peer information. 
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We find similar patterns of heterogeneity for both the online contingent valuation 
experiment and the context free lab experiment using a convenience sample. We find 
the culpability effect is larger when the information makes the subject feel good about 
themselves, then when the information makes them feel guilty. This result has 
potentially important implications for public policy. Strategies that 
induce culpability affect primarily individuals who are more inclined to reduce energy 
consumption in first place. As a consequence, they are likely to be highly cost-
ineffective and should not be seen as substitute for more traditional policies that are 
likely to alter the behavior or the entire population.  Prospect Theory (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1979) may also explain this asymmetry in response. In our results, people 
whose footprints exceed the reference amount would find themselves in the loss 
domain, and weight such a loss more heavily than the gain of being below the 
reference amount. However, we leave a fuller development of such theoretical 
implications to future research.  
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TABLE 3.5: Summary Statistics Split by Demographic Subgroup for Contingent 
Valuation Experiment
 126 
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TABLE 3.6: MLE Results for Democrat/Non-Democrat Split: Contingent Valuation 
Experiment 
 Democrat  Not Democrat 
 Full Model Short Model  Full Model Short Model 
Constant 13.83 184.54***  -34.96 2.35 
 (112.9) (37.41)  (66.09) (61.66) 
Relative 
Culpability 5.577** 4.20** 
 
1.942 2.00 
 (2.277) (2.02)  (1.386) (1.40) 
CO2 
Footprint -3.200 -2.28 
 
0.334 0.42 
 (2.162) (2.04)  (1.479) (1.49) 
NEP 3.509   4.957*** 5.42*** 
 (2.381)   (1.467) (1.37) 
Politics -54.25   14.35  
 (53.74)   (22.38)  
Children 26.38   31.28  
 (30.26)   (24.19)  
Gender 24.78   -42.37* -44.93** 
 (30.86)   (22.86) (21.55) 
Age 5.145   -16.00***  
 (10.22)   (6.107)  
Income 1.305   0.951 -12.19** 
 (1.377)   (0.838) (5.87) 
College -3.200   24.09  
 (2.162)   (23.50)  
Theta 69.17*** 73.40***  63.09*** 64.07*** 
 (6.824) (7.14)  (5.261) (5.35) 
Observations 80 80  115 115 
Log 
Likelihood -174.5 -178.38 
 
-244.1 -246.22 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 3.7: MLE Results for Demographic Subgroups for Contingent Valuation 
Experiment (Full regression) 
Subgroup Culpability Coefficient 
Liberal 3.33*** 
Not Liberal 2.58 
Children 4.54*** 
No Children 1.88 
Male 3.10** 
Female 2.89 
Age>36.5 5.14*** 
Age<36.5 1.10 
Income>4.7 5.47*** 
Income<4.7 0.16 
At least College 4.21*** 
Less than College 1.98 
NEP>34.5 4.63** 
NEP<34.5 1.55 
Democrat 5.58** 
Not Democrat 1.94 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix Table 3.1 Provides results for the OLS, Tobit, and IV specifications 
for the Lab Experiment results. The Tobit specification deals with the non-negativity 
constraint on the amount of public goods we allow each subject to provide. The IV 
uses the induced target culpability based on the exogenously assigned treatment group 
as an instrument for actual culpability, to ensure that the culpability variable is 
exogenous.  In columns 1 and 2 of Table 9, the effects of culpability (the difference 
between a subject’s own purchases in rounds 1 through 5 and the purchases of the 
subject whose information he or she saw) has no significant impact on purchases of 
the public good in round 6, even when we restrict our sample to just those subjects 
who received information not their own.  However, when we split our sample between 
in those who self-identify as Democrats versus those who do not, we see a significant, 
positive impact on culpability and footprint on contribution, compared with those who 
do not self-identify as Democrats.  (Compare columns three and four.) Columns five 
and six repeat this analysis of sub-sections of the data with a Tobit model, to check for 
biased estimates of coefficients due to censoring of allowed values of the contributions 
to the public good below zero. Finally, instrumental variables are used to control for 
the confounding effects of people who voluntarily purchase less than the privately 
optimal amount of the goods in rounds 1-5 on contribution to the public good.  Such a 
subject would have already made a sacrifice by forgoing possible earnings in the first 
five rounds in order to cause less harm to the group, and thus their culpability is 
affected.  By using a dummy for the type of subject (small or large) they received from 
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as an instrument for culpability, we can control for this effect, and confirm the positive 
correlation between culpability and contribution to the public good for Democrats. 
Appendix Tables 3.2 and 3.3 provides summary statistics and a correlation 
matrix for the demographic splits. 
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APPENDIX TABLE 3.2: Summary Statistics by Demographic Split 
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APPENDIX TABLE 3.2 (Continued) 
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APPENDIX TABLE 3.3: Correlation Matrix 
 
 
 
